Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs

1986

LDS Hospital v. Industrial Commission of Utah,
Second Injury Fund and Anna Webster: Brief of
Appellant
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
David L. Wilkinson; attorney general; Ralph L. Finlayson; assistant attorney general; Virginius
Dabney, Erie V. Boorman; attorneys for respondents.
Larry R. White; Kirton, McConkie & Bushnell; attorney for appellant.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, LDS Hospital v. Indistrial Commission of Utah, Second Injury Fund and Anna Webster, No. 860046.00 (Utah Supreme
Court, 1986).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/722

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

.S9

ggcKETNO-^ OQHb
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

LDS HOSPITAL,
Defendant and Appellant,
Case No. 860046

vs.
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH,
SECOND INJURY FUND and
ANNA WEBSTER,

tto-£?

Respondents.
BRIEF OF APPELLANT

Appeal from an Order of the Industrial Commission of Utah
which held that the Respondent Webster (1) was partially
dependent notwithstanding over $85,000 in savings and
(2) that the Second Injury Fund was not liable for
dependency benefits beyond the initial 312 weeks of benefits.
David L. Wilkinson
Attorney General
Ralph L. Finlayson
Assistant Attorney General
State Capitol, Room 236
Salt Lake City, UT 84114
Industrial Commission Attorneys

Larry R. White
KIRTON, McCONKIE & BUSHNELL
330 South Third East
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Attorney for Appellant

Virginius Dabney, Esq.
Kearns Building, Suite 412
136 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
Attorney for Respondent Webster
Erie V. Boorman, Esq.
Second Injury Fund
160 East 300 South
P. 0. Box 45580
Salt Lake Cityf Utah 84145-0580
Attorney for Second Injury Fund

ii

*3>*r T ta^Tk^T3 P

APR 111986
reme Court, Utah

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

LDS HOSPITAL,
Defendant and Appellant,
Case No. 860046

vs.
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH,
SECOND INJURY FUND and
ANNA WEBSTER,
Respondents.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

Appeal from an Order of the Industrial Commission of Utah
which held that the Respondent Webster (1) was partially
dependent notwithstanding over $85,000 in savings and
(2) that the Second Injury Fund was not liable for
dependency benefits beyond the initial 312 weeks of benefits.
David L. Wilkinson
Attorney General
Ralph L. Finlayson
Assistant Attorney General
State Capitol, Room 236
Salt Lake City, UT 84114
Industrial Commission Attorneys
Virginius Dabney, Esq.
Kearns Building, Suite 412
136 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
Attorney for Respondent Webster
Erie V. Boorman, Esq.
Second Injury Fund
160 East 300 South
P. 0. Box 45580
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0580
Attorney for Second Injury Fund

Larry R. White
KIRTON, McCONKIE & BUSHNELL
330 South Third East
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Attorney for Appellant

TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

ii

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

1

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

2

STATEMENT OF FACTS

4

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

6

ARGUMENT

8

Point I.

THE DETERMINATION THAT THE RESPONDENT WEBSTER
WAS PARTIALLY DEPENDENT WAS NOT WITHIN THE
LIMITS OF REASONABLENESS OR RATIONALITY,
AND THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION COMMITTED
REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT DID SO

Point II.

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT FAILED TO SET OUT ANY
STANDARD OR GUIDELINE BY WHICH TO DETERMINE WHETHER THE CLAIMANT AS A SURVIVOR OF
A WORKER WHO DIED AS A RESULT OF AN INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT WAS PARTIALLY DEPENDENT AFTER
THE TERMINATION OF THE 312 WEEK PERIOD . . .

12

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION COMMITTED
REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT REFUSED TO
REQUIRE* THE RESPONDENT TO USE ANY PORTION OF
THE CORPUS OF HER SAVINGS OF $85,504.72, AND
CONSIDERED ONLY THE INTEREST ON THIS
AMOUNT

14

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION COMMITTED
REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT FAILED TO HOLD
OR TAKE JUDICIAL NOTICE OF THE FACT
THAT AN ANNUAL CLOTHING EXPENSE OF
$2,400.00 WAS EXCESSIVE

18

Point III.

Point IV.

Point V.

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION COMMITTED
REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT REQUIRED THE
APPELLANT TO PAY AMOUNTS BEYOND THE
EQUIVALENT OF 312 WEEKS OF BENEFITS AS
SET OUT IN UTAH CODE ANNOTATED SECTION
3 5-1-68, AND IT REFUSED TO ORDER THE
SECOND INJURY FUND TO PAY DEPENDENCY
BENEFITS AFTER THE 312 WEEK PERIOD AS
PROVIDED IN UTAH CODE ANNOTATED SECTION
35-1-70

CONCLUSION

19

ADDENDUM

2

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases
Akin v. Akin Distributors, Inc., 386 P.2d 769
(Okl. 1963)

16

Board of Education of Alpine School District v. Olsen,
684 P.2d 49, 51 (Ut. 1984)
Farnsworth v. Industrial Commission, 534 P.2d 897
(Ut. 1975)

9, 13
11, 14

Terrinoni v. Westward Hoi, 418 So.2d 1143
(Fla. App. 1982)

17

Statutes and Rules
Utah Code Annotated § 35-1-67 (Supp.1985)
Utah Code Annotated § 35-1-68 (Supp.1985). .

3
2,3,4,5,7,14,18,19

Utah Code Annotated § 35-l-68(2)(b)(i) (Supp.1985)
Utah Code Annotated § 35-l-68(2)(b)(ii) (Supp.1985)

10
....

10

Utah Code Annotated § 35-l-68(2)(b)(iii) (Supp.1985) . . . .

10

Utah Code Annotated § 35-1-70 (1953)

3, 4, 9, 19, 21

Other Authorities
99 C.J.S. Workmen's Compensation § 134(2)

15

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.

Was the determination by the Industrial Commission

that the repondent, Anna Webster, was partially dependent within
the limits of reasonableness or rationality when taking into
account the clear fact that without dependency benefits the
respondent has $85f504.72 in savings and has sufficient funds to
meet her stated expenses and support herself in the style to
which she is accustomed?
2.

Did the Industrial Commission commit reversible

error when it failed to set out any standard or guideline by
which to determine the dependency of survivors of workers killed
as a result of industrial accidents after the termination of the
312 week initial dependency period?
3.

Did the Industrial Commission commit reversible

error when it refused to require the respondent to invade the
corpus of her $85f504.72 in savings, if necessary, and when it
considered only the interest on this amount and failed to
consider the amortization of her mortgage in September of 1985 in
determining her dependency?
4.

Did the Industrial Commission commit reversible

error when it failed to hold that an annual clothing expense of
$2,400 was excessive?
5.

Did the Industrial Commission commit reversible

error when it required the appellant to pay amounts beyond 312
weeks as set out in Utah Code Annotated § 35-1-68 and refused to

-1-

order the Second Injury Fund to pay dependency benefits after the
312 week period as provided in Utah Code Annotated § 35-1-70.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On July 20, 1979f Mr. Gene Websterf husband of the
respondent, Anna Webster, and an employee of LDS Hospital was
involved in a motorcycle accident which occurred while he was in
the course of his employment.

Temporary total disability bene-

fits commenced in August 1979 (Record at 139)(Record hereinafter
referred to as "R.").

On February 23, 1981, Mr. Webster's status

was changed to permanent total disability and benefits were paid
accordingly (R.10).

On December 15, 1982, Mr. Webster died due

to complications arising out of his industrial accident (R. 16,
139).

After Mr. Webster's death, Mrs. Webster received depen-

dency benefits for the equivalent of 312 weeks from the date of
the injury as required in Utah Code Annotated (hereinafter
U.C.A.) § 35-1-67 and § 35-1-68 (Contained in Addendum) as
ordered by the Industrial Commission (R. 14, 139). The record
shows that between 1979 and the date benefits ended in 1985,
weekly compensation paid to Mr. Webster and to his wife after his
death, amounted to $55,848.00 (R. 14), not including medical
expenses in the amount of at least $78,166.16 (R. 14). On the
date of termination of benefits Mrs. Webster was receiving
$179.00 per week or $716.00 per month (R. 10, 46).
Upon completion of the equivalent of 312 weeks of benefits, payments to Mrs. Webster were terminated in 1985 (R.10,
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31).

Mrs. Webster requested continued benefits (R. 21-23, 29)

from the Second Injury Fund which request was refused, notwithstanding the language in U.C.A. § 35-1-70 (contained in
Addendum).

Mrs. Webster then applied for a dependency review

provided for in U.C.A. § 35-1-68 (R.30).
A hearing was held before an Administrative Law Judge of
the Industrial Commission on June 26, 1985, (See ALJ's Findings
of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order in Addendum).

The

Administrative Law Judge, in an order dated July 2, 1985, held
Mrs. Webster to be partially dependent and awarded her $89.50 per
week or $358.00 per month continuing until otherwise ordered (R.
78-80).

A transcript of the proceedings was ordered and an

extension for filing a Motion for Review obtained (R. 107-108).
The Motion for Review was filed with the Industrial Commission on
August 26, 1985, in compliance with the order of the
Administrative Law Judge (R. 122-123).
During the pendency of the consideration of the Motion
for Review the employer requested the Second Injury Fund to pay
benefits beyond the 312 week period to the claimant and survivor
of Mr. Webster pursuant to U.C.A. § 35-1-70 (contained in
Addendum), which so provides (R. 136). The Second Injury Fund
refused (R. 137), and the defendant requested that the Industrial
Commission order the Second Injury Fund to comply with U.C.A. §
35-1-70 (R. 138).
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In an opinion dated January 9, 1986f the Industrial
Commission denied the Motion for Review and affirmed the
Administrative Law Judge's determination of partial dependency
(R. 139-141).
Addendum.)

(See Order Denying Motion for Review contained in

The Commission also refused to require the Second

Injury Fund to pay the benefits beyond the 312 week period.
The appellant's Petition for Review was filed with the
Clerk of this Court January 21, 1986 (R. 143-144).

The Docketing

Statement was filed February 6, 1986.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The facts in this case are not in dispute.

After the

death of Mrs. Webster's husband in 1982, she received dependency
benefits for the equivalent of 312 weeks after the date of the
injury of her husband as required by U.C.A. §35-1-68.

(Mr.

Webster was injured in 1979.)
At the time of the hearing before the administrative law
judge, at which time Mrs. Webster requested continued dependency
benefits beyond 312 weeks, it was shown that she had on deposit
in various savings accounts $85,504.72 (R. 48, 88). The claimant
testified that the total annual interest on this amount was
$8,093.33

(R. 59-60, 80, 90). She additionally testified that

she received monthly social security disability payments in the
amount of $493.60 (R. 86) and that her monthly retirement benefit
from LDS Hospital was $120.94 (R. 44, 88). It was shown that in
her checking account she had on deposit a balance of $1,528.87
(R. 91). Her stated yearly income plus cash on hand at the time
of the hearing was $16,996.68.

Mrs. Webster's stated yearly

expenses were $16,024.00 (R. 87) f which included an annual
estimated clothing expense of $2,400 (R. 48-49, 87).
However, in September 1985, her yearly mortgage expense
of $2,592.00 was reduced to the annual property tax of $405.95
due to the fact that the mortgage was paid in full that month,
meaning a reduction in annual expense of $2,187.00 (R. 50-51).
Mrs. Webster's monthly mortgage payment prior to payment in full
in September 1985 was $231.00 (R. 50-51).

Because Mrs. Webster

did not need to make three payments in 1985 her expenses were
reduced by $693.00, reducing the annual stated expenses of Mrs.
Webster for 1985 from $16,024.00 to $15,331.00.

Her financial

status for 1985 based on information she provided is summarized
as follows:

INCOME SUMMARY
12 months x $493.60 (Social Security)

$ 5,923.20

12 months x $120.94 (Pension)

1,451.28

Interest on Savings of $85,504.72

8,093.33

Cash on hand (checking account)

1,528 .87

TOTAL AVAILABLE INCOME (1985)

$16,996.68

EXPENSE SUMMARY
Stated estimated expenses
less 3 house payments (3 x $231.00)
MRS. WEBSTER'S ACTUAL TOTAL EXPENSES
(1985)
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$16,024.00
693.00
$15,331.00

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
U.C.A. § 35-1-68 requires that the dependency review at
the end of the 312 week period be based on the applicant's circumstances existing "at the time of the dependency review."

Even

without taking into account the corpus of the $85,504.72 in
savings that Mrs. Webster had on deposit at the time of the
dependency review, her stated interest income and cash on hand,
which totaled $16,996.69, exceeded her yearly stated expenses of
$16,024.00 (R.87).

This is true even if no deduction is made for

the $2,400.00 annual clothing expense and monthly $231.00 mortage
expense which ended in September of 1985 (R.51).

Her actual

expenses less three $231.00 mortgage payments was $15,331.00.
Accordingly, there was more than adequate income to meet
Mrs. Webster's stated living expenses in 1985 without taking into
account the reduction in expenses as indicated by the payoff of
the mortgage and the inordinately high estimated yearly clothing
expense of $2,400.00.
Considering that dependency after the initial 312 week
period is to be determined based on the circumstances and
conditions at the time of the dependency review, the appellant
maintains that the Administrative Law Judge and the Industrial
Commission erred when they determined that the claimant was
partially dependent.

With the reduction of three mortgage

payments of $231.00 each, totalling $693.00, Mrs. Webster's 1985
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estimated annual expenses of $16f024.00 was reduced to
$15f331.00.

This was well within the established annual income

of the claimant of $16f996.68.

Even a lower figure of

$15/467.81, arrived at by disallowing the amount of cash on hand
evidenced in Mrs. Webster's checking account, still would allow
the respondent to spend $200.00 per month for clothes which she
claimed was her accustomed lifestyle.
For 1986, Mrs. Webster's expenses are reduced by 12
payments of $231.00 each or $2,772 which, by adding back the
property tax obligation of $405.95, would mean a total annual
expense reduction of $2,366.05 for 1986 for a total expense in
1986 of $13,657.95.
The appellant maintains that it is painfully clear that
even without considering the $85,504.72 which the claimant had on
deposit, her income was sufficient to cover her stated expenses.
The $85,504.72 the claimant-respondent had in savings
should be considered as an asset, and the applicant should also
be required to utilize this amount for her expenses.

In taking

into account this large sum of money, she can hardly be dependent
and, in fact, by most standards would be considered affluent.
The self-insured employer should not be forced to build
the applicant's estate which is what the Industrial Commission
has accomplished by refusing to require the claimant-respondent
to utilize any portion of the of the principal of her substantial
savings.
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To compound the lack of rationality of its decision, the
Industrial Commission provided no standard upon which to judge
whether the survivor of an employee who has died as a result of
an industrial injury is dependent at the time of the dependency
review.

Rather, the Commission simply stated in its denial of

the appellant's motion for review:
The Commission finds this [the award] to be an
equitable compromise between the interest of
the two parties. (R. 141) (emphasis added)
While compromise may be appropriate in a settlement, it is not a
standard upon which to determine whether a decedent's survivor is
wholly or partially dependent.
Finally, the appellant maintains that although U.C.A.
§ 35-1-68 requires initial payment of dependency benefits beyond
the 312 week period by the employer upon a finding on continued
dependency, reimbursement is contemplated by U.C.A. § 35-1-70,
otherwise, this statutory provision is void of any meaning.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE DETERMINATION THAT THE RESPONDENT WEBSTER WAS
PARTIALLY DEPENDENT, WAS NOT WITHIN THE LIMITS OF
REASONABLENESS OR RATIONALITY, AND THE INDUSTRIAL
COMMISSION COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT DID SO.
Decisions of the Industrial Commission regarding
workers' compensation when considered on appeal to the Supreme
Court must fall within limits of reasonableness or rationality.
As stated in Board of Education of Alpine School District v.
Olsen, 684 P.2d 49, 51 (Ut. 1984):

The decision belowf that Olsen [the claimant]
was an employee for purposes of Workers1
Compensation is entitled to some deference,
but it is subject to judiciary review to
assure that it falls within the limits of
reasonableness or rationality.
A. Dependency was not determined based on the facts and circumstances at the time of the hearing
Utah law is clear that after a dependent of an employee
who has died receives the equivalent of no more than 85% of the
state average weekly wage at the time of injury for a period not
to exceed six years from the date of the injury (U.C.A. § 35-168(2)(b)(i)), that further consideration of dependency after that
period is to be based on the operative facts and circumstances at
the time of the continued dependency hearing.

As stated in

U.C.A. § 35-1-68(2)(b)(iii):
The issue of dependency shall be subject
to review by the Commission at the end of the
initial six-year period and annually thereafter. If at any such review it is determined
that, under the facts and circumstances existing at that time, that the applicant is no
longer a wholly dependent person, the applicant may be considered a partly dependent or
non dependent person and shall be paid such
benefits as the Commission may determine pursuant to Subsection (2)(c)(ii). (emphasis
added)
That this is the case is reiterated in U.C.A. § 35-1-68(2)(c)(ii)
which states:
Benefits to persons determined to be
partly dependent pursuant to Subsection
(2)(b)(iii) shall be determined by the
Commission in keeping with the circumstances
and conditions of dependence existing at the
time of the dependency review and will be paid
in a weekly amount not exceeding the maximum
-9-

weekly rate that partly dependent persons
would receive if wholly dependent. (emphasis
added)
The Administrative Law Judge (hereinafter ALJ) did not
follow the requirement of taking into consideration all facts and
circumstances that were in existence at the time of the
hearing.

This is evidenced by his statement made to appellant's

counsel at the time of the hearing:
Wellf counsel, your point is misplaced.
Case law provides that dependency is determined at the time of death. (R. 63)
Presumably, the ALJ's decision, which was affirmed by
the Industrial Commission, was based on a misapprehension of the
law.
B. The Respondent Webster was not dependent on the workers1
Compensation dependency benefits of $716.00 per month at the date
of the earning even without taking into account the principle of
$85,504.72 in savings.
The appellant maintains that the standard which should
be applied in determining dependency is whether the survivor of
the deceased worker is reliant on the dependency benefits
received prior to termination of the 312 week period as necessary
to maintain that dependent in his or her accustomed station in
life.

(See Farnsworth v. Industrial Commission, 534 P.2d 897

(Ut. 1975) contained in Addendum.)

In applying this standard to

the fact situation, the claimant is not dependent.
The claimant's stated yearly expenses were $16,024.00.
(R.87). However, this figure assumed a continued monthly mortage
payment of $231.00 which actually ended in September of 1985 (R.
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50-51) and an annual clothing expense of $2,400.00 (R. 48-49,
87).

Even so, the claimant had adequate funds without invading

the corpus of her $85,504.72 in savings to cover these
expenses.

Her stated yearly income for 1985 plus cash on hand as

indicated in the most current banking statement (R.91) is summarized as follows:
1985
12 months x $493.60
months x $120.94
Interest
Cash on Hand
TOTAL INCOME

$5,923.20 12
1,451.28
8,093.33
1,520.87
$16,996.68

Stated Expense
$16,024.00
Less 3 months of mortgage
payments ($3 x $231) . . . . $
693.00
EXPENSES

$15,331.00

As can be readily seen, without touching her substantial
savings and not allowing for the amortization of the mortgage
which occurred in September of 1985 or questioning the credibility of a $2,400.00 annual clothing expense, the claimant had
adequate funds to meet her yearly expenses and maintain her in
her accustomed station in life in 1985.
Accordingly, the appellant asserts that the Industrial
Commission rendered a decision which was not within the limits of
reasonableness or rationality and the Order of the Industrial
Commission should be reversed and dependency denied.
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POINT II
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR
WHEN IT FAILED TO SET OUT ANY STANDARD OR GUIDELINE BY
WHICH TO DETERMINE WHETHER THE CLAIMANT AS A SURVIVOR
OF A WORKER WHO DIED AS AS RESULT OF AN INDUSTRIAL
ACCIDENT WAS PARTIALLY DEPENDENT AFTER THE TERMINATION OF THE 312 WEEK PERIOD.
In Board of Education of Alpine School District v*
Olsen, 684 P.2d 49, 51 (Ut. 1984) , this Court stated:
In reviewing interpretations of general
questions of law, such as the one before us,
we apply a correction-of-error standard, with
no deference to the expertise of the
Industrial Commission.
The Court will search vainly for any sort of standard
applied by either the Industrial Commission or the Administrative
Law Judge as a test for determining dependency.

Instead, the

Industrial Commission stated in its denial of the appellant's
Motion for Review in the Record at page 141:
As there are no legislative guidelines in
this area, the Commission feels that in this
particular case the Administrative Law Judge
fairly fashioned the award of continued
benefits by taking into account the interest
income the claimant received from her savings
and excluding the corpus. The Commission
finds this to be an equitable compromise
between the interests of two parties and
therefore must deny the defendant's first
motion for review.
The term "dependency" is not defined in the Utah Code
and there are no Utah cases determining the meaning of
"dependency" or "dependent" after the 312 week initial dependency
period.
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The case of Farnsworth v. Industrial Commission/ 534
P.2d 897, 899 (Ut. 1975), defined "dependent" in a case when the
worker died very close to the time of the industrial accident as
"one who looks to another for support", and that the true
criteria of dependency was whether "one has a reasonable
expectation of continuing or future support to receive such
contributions as are necessary and needed to maintain him in his
accustomed station in life."
Therefore, it is necessary to look to at least the
claimed expenses of the person claiming dependency and the circumstances at the time of the dependency hearing to determine if
the claimant is dependent on the workers' compensation benefits
being received at the time of the termination of these benefits.
The Industrial Commission failed to analyze the claimant's
expenses and her dependency on the workers' compensation
benefits.

In failing to do this and to apply the previously

mentioned standard, i.e. dependency on the workers' compensation
benefits, the appellant maintains that the Industrial Commission
committed reversible error and entered a "compromise" order
(R.141) which is totally beyond what is contemplated in U.C.A.
§ 35-1-68.
decision.

Furthermore, the Commission provided no basis for its
The weekly compensation figure of $89.50 seems to have

been pulled from thin air with little or no analysis as to
respondent's income versus expenses and dependency on the $716.00
monthly dependency benefit received prior to termination.

-13-

POINT III
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR
WHEN IT REFUSED TO REQUIRE THE RESPONDENT TO USE THE CORPUS OF
HER SAVINGS OF $85,504.72f AND WHEN IT CONSIDERED ONLY
THE INTEREST ON THIS AMOUNT.
In the Administrative Law Judge's Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law and Order, he determined as follows:
• . . [T]he Administrative Law Judge finds
that the interest earned by a surviving spouse
should be included as income, however, the
applicant should not be forced to invade the
principle or corpus, in order to meet the
every day necessities of life. (R.79)
In addition, the Industrial Commission in the Order
Denying the Motion for Review filed by the Appellant stated as
follows in this regard:
In this case, the issue is narrowed to
whether or not a claimant need exhaust all
financial resources before a finding of
dependency is appropriate. As there are no
legislative guidelines in this area, the
Commission feels that, in this particular
case, the Administrative Law Judge fairly
fashioned the award of continued benefits by
taking into account the interest income the
claimant received from her savings and
excluding the corpus. (R.141)
In other words, the Commission held that the claimant
was not required to utilize any of the corpus of the $85,504.72
in savings that she had accumulated.

This runs directly contrary

to the authorities available on the subject.
99 C.J.S. Workmen1s Compensation § 134(2) at page 457
states as follows with regard to the principle that survivors of
a workman who has died as a result of an industrial accident are
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required to look to their own resources:
• . . [I]t has been held that under
particular circumstances one who refrains from
the use of resources reasonably available to
him for his own support is not dependent on a
person who is supporting him. One is not a
dependent who has otherwise reasonable
support, that is, one cannot be said to be a
dependent who has sufficient means at hand for
supplying present necessities judging these
according to his class and position in life.
This standard seems to be in accordance with the
decision in the case of Akin v. Akin Distributors, Inc., 386 P. 2d
769 (Okl. 1963), (See Addendum) where the Oklahoma Supreme Court
determined that a mother was not dependent on her deceased child
when she had an income of $700.00 per month, received income on
leased property in the amount of $15,000.00*per year, owned stock
with an estimated value of $50,000.00, one Cadillac automobile
and eight riding horses.
The Akin case involves a situation where the decedent
died immediately following the accident, not a case where there
was a three and one-half year delay between the time the injured
employee suffered his accident and the date he died with continuing dependency benefits to his spouse after the date he died.
Nevertheless, the basic principle is the same, and the claimant
should be required to look to available assets.

The Oklahoma

Supreme Court considered shares of stock an asset not just the
dividends.

In the instant case, the Industrial Commission

entered an order which in the Akin case would have required only
the consideration of dividends and not the underlying stock.
-15-

Another case which is probably the most closely on point
is Terrinoni v. Westward Hoi, 418 So.2d 1143 (Fla. App. 1982)
(See Addendum).

In this case, it was initially determined at the

time of the decedent's death that his mother was dependent upon
him.

However, after she had received $155,000.00 in workers'

compensation dependency benefits, they were terminated because
the court below determined that the claimant was not dependent
upon the workers' compensation death benefits to maintain her
customary standard of living after receiving these benefits.

The

Florida statute was different than Utah's statute in that it
allowed dependency to be determined only at the time of the
employee's death.

The Utah statute provides for a second

determination after the end of the six-year period based on the
facts and circumstances at the time of the continued dependency
hearing.

The Florida court determined that because the claimant

had received $155,000.00 in benefits that her dependency
terminated, and she had sufficient funds to maintain her
accustomed station in life.

Appellant maintains that the same is

true for the respondent, Mrs. Webster.
It has been demonstrated in ARGUMENT POINT I that Mrs.
Webster has enough income without invading principal to maintain
herself in the style to which she is accustomed.

In addition,

she should be required to use her savings because the test for
dependency must take into account "all the facts and
circumstances in existence at the time of the dependency review
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hearing" (See U.C.A. § 35-1-68).

Because the corpus of

$85,504.72, Mrs. Webster's savings, was not taken into account by
the Industrial Commission, this requirement was not met.

The

respondent, contrary to well-settled authorities, was not ordered
to use the resources reasonably available to her.
By its order, the Industrial Commission has required the
appellant to finance the building of respondent's substantial
estate.

Appellant maintains that surely no such result was ever

intended by the legislature, and the order of the Industrial
Commission is contrary to law and constitutes reversible error.
POINT IV
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION COMMITTED REVERSIBLE
ERROR WHEN IT FAILED TO HOLD OR TAKE JUDICIAL
NOTICE OF THE FACT THAT AN ANNUAL CLOTHING
EXPENSE OF $2,400.00 WAS EXCESSIVE.
The claimant estimated at the time of the hearing and in
her answers to interrogatories that her yearly clothing expense
on a stated total annual expense of $16,024.00 (not taking into
account the fully amortized mortgage in September 198 5) was
$2,400.00 per year.

(R. 49, 87)

The appellant-defendant

maintains that this is so excessive as to shock the conscience,
and the Commission should have taken judicial notice of this
fact.

The Industrial Commission erred in allowing this total

expense.
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POINT V
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR
WHEN IT REQUIRED THE APPELLANT TO PAY AMOUNTS BEYOND
THE EQUIVALENT OF 312 WEEKS OF BENEFITS AS SET OUT IN
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED SECTION 35-1-68, AND IT REFUSED
TO ORDER THE SECOND INJURY FUND TO PAY DEPENDENCY
BENEFITS AFTER THE 312 WEEK PERIOD AS PROVIDED IN
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED SECTION 3 5-1-70.
U.C.A. § 35-1-70 states as follows:
If any wholly dependent persons, who have
been receiving the benefits of this title, at
the termination of such benefits are yet in a
dependent condition, and under all reasonable
circumstances should be entitled to additional
benefits, the Industrial Commission may, in
its discretion, extend indefinetly such benefits; but the liability of the employer or the
insurance carrier involved shall not be
extended, and the additional benefits allowed
shall be paid out of the special fund provided
for in subdivision (1) of section 35-1-68.
(U.C.A. § 35-1-68(1) refers to the Second Injury Fund.)
As provided in U.C.A. § 35-1-70, the Industrial
Commission did indeed extend dependency benefits of the
respondent, but when the employer requested that the Second
Injury Fund pay the continued dependency benefits as provided in
U.C.A. § 35-1-70, the Second Injury Fund refused (R. 137).
Furthermore, when the respondent requested the Industrial
Commission to order the Second Injury Fund to pay, it refused to
do so (R. 138, 139-141).
The appellant maintains that the Second Injury Fund and
the Industrial Commission have both failed to comply with the
requirements of U.C.A. § 35-1-70.

The overwhelming evidence

shows that the respondent Webster is not dependent and that she
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has substantial assets to support herself in her "accustomed
station in life."

However if this Court determines that she

continues to be dependent, the continued dependency benefits past
the 312-week period should be paid by the Second Injury Fund and
not the employer.

Accordingly, the Appellant requests that the

Industrial Commission's order be reversed and the Second Injury
Fund be ordered to pay Mrs. Webster's continuing benefits in the
event they are upheld.

CONCLUSION
It is abundantly clear that the respondent Webster has
more than enough funds to maintain her in her "accustomed station
in life" without invading the corpus of the $85,504.74 which
constitute her savings.
Nevertheless, if it were necessary for her to do sof
Utah law suggests and the authorities are clear that all of a
person's assets who claims to be dependent must be considered
when determining this issue.

The insurer or employer should not

be required to preserve a substantial estate for the person
claiming dependency.

The accumulation of $85,000.00 would be

considered by many to constitute affluence.

If the Industrial

Commission's order is carried to its logical extention, a person
who has millions of dollars of real property or stock could be
determined to be dependent because he or she would not be
required to sell any of it. The Industrial Commission's order
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that Mrs. Webster need not use any of the corpus of her savings
is contrary to the authority on the issue and is repugnant to
ordinary common sense.

This order should be reversed.

Finally, U.C.A. § 35-1-70 makes it clear that after the
initial dependency period of 312 weeks or its equivalent, that
any additional dependency is to be paid by the Second Injury
Fund.

Nevertheless, the Industrial Commission refused to order

the Second Injury Fund to pay the additional dependency benefits
which the ALJ ordered and which the Commission affirmed, thereby
further constituting error.
In light of the reasons set out herein, the appellant,
LDS Hospital, respectfully requests that this .Court reverse the
decision of the Industrial Commission on the issue of
dependency.

In the alternative, appellant requests that this

Court order that the continued dependency benefits be paid by the
Second Injury Fund.
DATED this

of April, 1986.
Respectfully submitted
KIRTON, McCONKIE & BUSHNELL
By:
Larry R. Jwhite
A t t o r n e y s for A p p e l l a n t
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Item
U.C.A. § 35-1-67 (Supp. 1985)

Exhibit A

U.C.A. § 35-1-68 (Supp. 1985)

Exhibit B

U.C.A. §35-1-70 (1953)

Exhibit C

ALJ's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law,
and Order, July 2, 1985

Exhibit D

Order of Commission Denying Motion for Review
August 26, 1985
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Akin v. Akin Distributors, Inc., 386 P.2d 769
(Okl. 1963)

Exhibit F

Farnsworth v. Industrial Commission, 534 P.2d 897
(Ut. 1975)

Exhibit G

Terrinoni v. Westward Hoi, 418 So. 2d 1143
(Fla. App. 1982)

Exhibit H
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EXHIBIT A

35-1-67

LABOR - INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
DECISIONS UNDKR FORMER LAW

Retroactive application of 1971 amend*
ment.
In paragraph dealing with injuries not
specified, former language "not exceeding in
any case two hundred weeks" simply stated
a limitation of 200 weeks on any award and
was not intended to represent the "whole

man" against which a percentage of disability should be applied; 1971 amendment substituting "312 weeks" for "two hundred
weeks" was in the nature of a clarification or
amplification so that application of percenta e of
£
disability to 312 weeks in award governed by statute prior to 1971 amendment
was not an improper retroactive application
of the amendment. Oakland Constr. Co. v.
Industrial Comm. (1974) 520 P 2d 208.

35-1-67. Permanent total disability — Amount of payments — Vocational
rehabilitation — Procedure and payments. In cases of permanent total disability
the employee shall receive 66 % % of his average weekly wages at the time of the
injury, but not more than a maximum of 85% of the state average weekly wage
at the time of the injury per week and not less than a minimum of $45 per week
plus $5 for a dependent spouse and $5 for each dependent minor child under the
age of 18 years, up to a maximum of four dependent minor children not to exceed
the average weekly wage of the employee at the time of the injury, but not to
exceed 85% of the state average weekly wage at the time of the injury per week.
However, in no case of permanent total disability shall the employer or its insurance carrier be required to pay weekly compensation payments for more than 312
weeks. A finding by the commission of permanent total disability shall in all cases
be tentative and not final until such time as the following proceedings have been
had: If the employee has tentatively been found to be permanently and totally disabled, it shall be mandatory that the industrial commission of Utah refer the
employee to the division of vocational rehabilitation under the state board of education for rehabilitation training and it shall be the duty of the commission to
order paid to the vocational rehabilitation division, out of the second injury fund
provided for by Subsection 35-1-68 (1), not to exceed $1,000 for use in the rehabilitation and training of the employee; the rehabilitation and training of the employee
shall generally follow the practice applicable under Section 35-1-69, relating to the
rehabilitation of employees having combined injuries. If the division of vocational
rehabilitation under the state board of education certifies to the industrial commission of Utah in writing that the employee has fully cooperated with the division
of vocational rehabilitation in its efforts to rehabilitate him, and in the opinion
of the division the employee may not be rehabilitated, the commission shall order
that there be paid to the employee weekly benefits at the rate of 66 % % of his
average weekly wages at the time of the injury, but not more than a maximum
of 85% of the state average weekly wage at the time of the injury per week and
not less than a minimum of $45 per week plus $5 for a dependent spouse and $5
for each dependent minor child under the age of 18 years, up to a maximum of
four dependent minor children not to exceed the average weekly wage of the
employee at the time of the injury, but not to exceed 85% of the state average
weekly wage at the time of the injury per week out of the second injury fund provided for by Subsection 35-1-68 (1), for such period of time beginning with the time
that the payments,as in this section provided, to be made by the employer or its
insurance carrier terminate and ending with the death of the employee. No
employee shall be entitled to any such benefits if he fails or refuses to cooperate
with the division of vocational rehabilitation under this section.
All persons who are permanently and totally disabled and entitled to benefits
from the second injury fund under Subsection 35-1-68 (1), including those injured
prior to March 6, 1949, shall receive not less than [$443] $120 per week when paid
only by the second injury fund, or when combined with compensation payments
42
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of the employer or the insurance carrier. The division of vocational rehabilitation
shall, at the termination of the vocational training of the employee, certify to the
industrial commission of Utah the work the employee is qualified to perform, and
thereupon the commission shall, after notice to the employer and an opportunity
to be heard, determine whether the employee has, notwithstanding such rehabilitation, sustained a loss of bodily function.
The loss or permanent and complete loss of use of both hands or both arms, or
both feet or both legs, or both eyes, or of any two thereof, constitutes total and
permanent disability, to be compensated according to the provisions of this section
and no tentative finding of permanent total disability is required in those
instances. In all other cases where there has been rehabilitation effected but where
there is some loss of bodily function, the award shall be based upon partial permanent disability.
In no case shall the employer or the insurance carrier be required to pay compensation for any combination of disabilities of any kind as provided in Sections
35-1-65, 35-1-66 and this section, including loss of function, in excess of 85% of the
state average weekly wage at the time of the injury per week for 312 weeks.
History: L. 1917, ch. 100, § 78; C.L. 1917,
§3139; L. 1919, ch. 63, § 1; R.S. 1933, 42-1-63:
L. 1937, ch. 41, § 1; 1939, ch. 51, § 1; C. 1943,
42-1-63; L. 1945, ch. 65, § 1; 1949, ch. 52, § 1
1951, ch. 55, § 1; 1955, ch. 57, § 1; 1957, ch. 62,
§ 1; 1959, ch. 55, § 1; 1961, ch. 71, § 1; 1963, ch,
49, § 1; 1965, ch. 68, § 1; 1967, ch. 65, § 1; 1969,
ch. 86, § 5; 1971, ch. 76, § 6; 1973, ch. 67, § 4;
1974, ch. 13, §1; 1975, ch. 101, §5; 1977, ch
150, §1; 1977, ch. 151, §3; 1977, ch. 156, §6;
1979, ch. 138, § 2; 1981, ch. 286, § 1; 1983, ch.
356, § 1; 1985, ch. 160, § 1.

date or prior thereto were receiving compensation benefits from the special fund provided for by section 35-1-68(1) shall be paid
compensation benefits at the rate of $60 per
week.
"Commencing July 1, 1975, all persons who
were permanently and totally disabled on or
before March 5, 1949, and were receiving
compensation benefits and continue to
receive such benefits shall be paid compensation benefits from the special fund provided
for by section 35-1-68 (1) at a rate sufficient
to bring their weekly benefit to $60 when
Compiler's Notes.
combined with employer or insurance carrier
The 1975 amendment substituted "85% of compensation payments."
the state average weekly wage" for "66 % %
The 1977 amendment by chapter 150, in the
of the state average weekly wage" four times two paragraphs deleted by the 1977 amendin the first paragraph and once in the last ment by chapter 156 (quoted above) substiparagraph; increased the minimum benefit tuted "1977" for "1971" and "1975" and
per week from $35 to $45 in the first para- substituted "$75" for "$60."
graph; inserted "not to exceed the average
The 1979 amendment increased the miniweekly wage of the employee at the time of mum benefit in the second paragraph from
the injury" twice in the first paragraph; $75 to $85.
increased the benefit per week from $50 to
The 1981 amendment substituted "second
$60 at the end of the third paragraph injury fund" for "special fund" throughout
(deleted by the 1977 amendment) and near the section; and increased the amount in the
the end of the fourth paragraph (deleted by second paragraph from $85 to $100.
the 1977 amendment); and substituted "July
The 1983 amendment substituted "under
1, 1975" for "July 1, 1974" in the fourth para- this section" at the end of the first paragraph (deleted by the 1977 amendment).
graph for "as set forth herein"; increased the
The 1977 amendment by chapter 151 sub- minimum amount in the first sentence of the
stituted "spouse" for "wife" in the first para- second paragraph from $100 to $110; and
graph.
made minor changes in phraseology, punctuThe 1977 amendment by chapter 156 made ation and style.
the same changes as the 1977 amendment by
chapter 151; combined the first two para- Effective Date.
graphs into one paragraph; inserted the secSection 2 of Laws 1985, ch. 160 provided:
ond paragraph; and deleted the former third "This act takes effect upon approval by the
and fourth paragraphs which read: "Com- governor, or the day following the constitumencing July 1, 1971, all persons who are tional time limit of Article VII, Sec. 8 withpermanently and totally disabled and on that out the governor's signature, or in the case
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of a veto, the date of veto override."
Approved March 18, 1985.
Prior accidents contributing to disability.
_
,
.
Employee who was permanently and
totally disabled due to a combination of prior
and present accidents was entitled to lifetime
benefits payable from the special fund provided for in 35-1-68. McPhie v. Industrial
Comm. (1977) 567 P 2d 153.
Statute of limitations.
This section governs permanent total disability claims and contains no statute of limitations for such claims; therefore, where
employee suffered an injury in October of
1961 and notice of injury and claim was properly given and filed in accordance with
requirements of 35-1-99 and 35-1-100, and
employee was found to have suffered permanent partial disability and received 40 weeks
of compensation through December of 1964
and payment of medical bill through 1966,

employee's claim filed in December of 1982
for permanent total disability resulting from
f™ deterioration of a condition caused by
1961 injury was timely filed under this sect i o n and> u n d e r 3 5 . ^ i n d u s t r i a I c o m m i s s i o n h a d c o n t i n u i n g jurisdiction to award
p e r m a n e n t t o t a , disability compensation,
M e c h a m v I n d u s t r i a l C o m m . of U t a h ( 1 9 8 4 )
CQOV p OA 7«Q
^
* ™"
Total
disability.
Where an employee demonstrates that he
can no longer perform his normal duties as
a result of a work-related accident, and that
he cannot be rehabilitated, the burden shifts
to the employer to prove that suitable, steady
w r
° k is available, considering the age, mental capacity, and education of the employee,
m
order to preclude a determination of total
and permanent disability under the odd-lot
doctrine. Marshall v. Industrial Comm. of
Utah (1984) 681 P 2d 208.

35-1-68. Second Injury Fund — Injury causing death — Burial expenses
— No dependents, payments to Default Indemnity Fund — Payments to dependents. (1) There is created a Second Injury Fund for the purpose of making payments in accordance with Chapters 1 and 2 of this title. This fund shall succeed
to all monies heretofore held in that fund designated as the "Special Fund" or the
"Combined Injury Fund" and whenever reference is made elsewhere in this code
to the "Special Fund" or the "Combined Injury Fund" that reference shall be
deemed to be to the Second Injury Fund. The state treasurer shall be the custodian
of the Second Injury Fund and the commission shall direct its distribution. Reasonable administration assistance may be paid from the proceeds of that fund. The
attorney general shall appoint a member of his staff to represent the Second Injury
Fund in all proceedings brought to enforce claims against it.
(2) If injury causes death within the period of six years from the date of the
accident, the employer or insurance carrier shall pay the burial expenses of the
deceased as provided in Section 35-1-81, and further benefits in the amounts and
to the persons as follows:
(a) If the commission has made a determination that there are no dependents
of the deceased, it may, prior to a lapse of one year from the date of death of
a deceased employee, issue a temporary order for the employer or insurance carrier
to pay into the Default Indemnity Fund the sum of $30,000. When the amount in
the Default Indemnity Fund reaches or exceeds $500,000, the $30,000 shall thereafter be paid into the Second Injury Fund. If the amount in the Default Indemnity
Fund falls below $500,000 at any time after reaching the initial $500,000, the commission shall direct payments into either the Second Injury Fund or the Default
Indemnity Fund as may be required so as to maintain the Default Indemnity Fund
at or near $500,000. Before payment into either fund, the $30,000 shall be reduced
by the amount of any weekly compensation payments paid to or due the deceased
between the date of the accident and death. If a dependency claim is filed subsequent to the issuance of such an order and, thereafter, a determination of dependency is made by the commission, the award shall first be paid out of the sum
deposited for credit to the Default Indemnity Fund or the Second Injury Fund by
the employer or insurance carrier before any further claim may be asserted against
the employer or insurance carrier. If no dependency claim is filed within one year
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from the date of death, the commission's temporary order shall become permanent
and final. If no temporary order has been issued and no claim for dependency has
been filed within one year from the date of death, the commission may issue a
permanent order at any time requiring the carrier or employer to pay $30,000 into
the Second Injury Fund Any claim for compensation by a dependent must be filed
with the commission within one year from the date of death of the deceased.
(b) (i) If there are wholly dependent persons at the time of the death, the payment by the employer or insurance carrier shall be 66 % % of the decedent's average weekly wage at the time of the injury, but not more than a maximum of 85%
of the state average weekly wage at the time of the injury per week and not less
than a minimum of $45 per week plus $5 for a dependent spouse and $5 for each
dependent minor child under the age of 18 years, up to a maximum of four such
dependent minor children not to exceed the average weekly wage of the employee
at the time of the injury, but not to exceed 85% of the state average weekly wage
at the time of the injury per week, to continue during dependency for the remainder of the period between the date of the death and not to exceed six years or
312 weeks after the date of the injury.
(ii) The weekly payment to wholly dependent persons during dependency following the expiration of the first six-year period described in Subsection (2)(b)(i) shall
be an amount equal to the weekly benefits paid to those wholly dependent persons
during that initial six-year period, reduced by 50% of any weekly federal social
security death benefits paid to those wholly dependent persons.
(iii) The issue of dependency shall be subject to review by the commission at
the end of the initial six-year period and annually thereafter. If in any such review
it is determined that, under the facts and circumstances existing at that time, the
applicant is no longer a wholly dependent person, the applicant may be considered
a partly dependent or non dependent person and shall be paid such benefits as the
commission may determine pursuant to Subsection (2)(c)(ii).
(iv) For purposes of any dependency determination, a surviving spouse of a
deceased employee shall be conclusively presumed to be wholly dependent for a sixyear period from the date of death of the employee. This presumption shall not
apply after the initial six-year period and, in determining the then existing annual
income of the surviving spouse, the commission shall exclude 50% of any federal
social security death benefits received by that surviving spouse.
(c) (i) If there are partly dependent persons at the time of the death, the payment shall be 66 % % of the decedent's average weekly wages at the time of the
injury, but not more than a maximum of 85% of the state average weekly wage
at the time of the injury per week and not less than a minimum of $45 per week,
to continue during dependency for the remainder of the period between the date
of death and not to exceed six years or 312 weeks after the date of injury as the
commission in each case may determine and shall not amount to more than a maximum of $30,000. The benefits provided for in this subsection shall be in keeping
with the circumstances and conditions of dependency existing at the date of injury,
and any amount awarded by the commission under this subsection must be consistent with the general provisions of this title.
(ii) Benefits to persons determined to be partly dependent pursuant to Subsection (2)(b)(iii) shall be determined by the commission in keeping with the circumstances and conditions of dependency existing at the time of the dependency review
and may be paid in a weekly amount not exceeding the maximum weekly rate that
partly dependent person would receive if wholly dependent.
(iii) Payments under this section shall be paid to such persons during their
dependency by the employer or insurance carrier.
(d) If there are wholly dependent persons and also partly dependent persons
at the time of death, the commission may apportion the benefits as it deems just
45
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and equitable; provided, that the total benefits awarded to all parties concerned
shall not exceed the maximum provided for by law.
(e) If there are wholly or partly dependent persons at the time of death and
the total amount of the awards paid by the employer or its insurance carrier to
said dependents, prior to the termination of dependency, including any remarriage
settlement, does not exceed $30,000, the employer or its insurance carrier shall pay
the difference between the amount paid and $30,000 into the Second Injury Fund
provided for in Subsection (1).
History: L. 1917, ch. 100, § 79; C.L. 1917,
§ 3140; L. 1921, ch. 67, § 1; R.S. 1933, 42-1-64;
L. 1937, ch. 41, § 1; 1939, ch. 51, § 1; C. 1943,
42-1-64; L. 1945, ch. 65, § 1; 1949, ch. 52, § 1;
1951, ch. 55, § 1; 1955, ch. 57, § 1; 1957, ch. 62,
§ 1; 1959, ch. 55, § 1; 1961, ch. 71, § 1; 1963, ch.
49, § 1; 1965, ch. 68, § 1; 1967, ch. 65, § 1; 1969,
ch. 86, § 6; 1971, ch. 76, § 7; 1973, ch. 67, § 5;
1975, ch. 101, § 6; 1977, ch. 151, § 4; 1977, ch.
156, § 7; 1979, ch. 138, § 3; 1984, ch. 80, § 1.
Compiler's Notes.
The 1975 amendment added the last two
sentences to subsec. (1) (deleted in 1979); substituted "85% of the state average weekly
wage" for "66 % % of the state average
weekly wage" in subds. (2)(b)(i), (2)(c)(i) and
former subsec. (5) (deleted in 1979); increased
the minimum benefit per week from $35 to
$45 in subds. (2)(b)(i), (2)(c)(i) and former
subsec. (5) (deleted in 1979); and inserted
"not to exceed the average weekly wage of
the employee at the time of the injury" after
"four such dependent minor children" in
subd. (2)(b)(i).
The 1977 amendment by chapter 151 substituted "spouse" for "wife" near the middle
ofsubd. (2)(b)(i).
The 1977 amendment by chapter 156 made
the same change as the 1977 amendment by
chapter 151; substituted "in section 35-1-81"
near the beginning of present subsec. (2) for
"herein"; and added the last sentence of
former subsec. (4) (deleted in 1979) relating
to reviewing the issue of dependency at the
time application was made for additional
benefits from the special fund.
The 1979 amendment inserted subsec. (1);
designated the former introductory paragraph as subsec. (2); substituted subd. (2)(a)
for former subd. (1) which read: "If there are
no dependents, the employer and insurance
carrier shall pay into the state treasury the
sum of $15,600. Any claim for compensation
must be filed with the commission within one
year from the date of death of the deceased,
and, if at the end of one year from the date
of death of the deceased, no claim for compensation shall have been filed with the commission, the said sum of $15,600 shall be paid
at that time into the state treasury by the

employer or the insurance carrier. This payment shall be reduced by the amount of any
weekly compensation payments paid to or
due the deceased between the date of the
accident and his death. Such payment shall
be held in a special fund for the purposes
provided in this title; the state treasurer
shall be the custodian of such special fund,
and the commission shall direct the distribution thereof. If the commission has reasonably determined that there are no
dependents of the deceased, it may order the
employer or insurance carrier to pay into the
state treasury the sum specified in this subsection to be held in that special fund for a
period of one year from the death of the
deceased. Any claim filed within that year
for which an award is made by the commission shall be paid out of the sum deposited
by the employer or insurance carrier before
any further claim may be asserted against
the employer or insurance carrier";
redesignated former subsec. (2) as subd.
(2)(b)(i); inserted "by the employer or insurance carrier" after "payment" near the
beginning of subd. (2)(b)(i); added subds.
(2)(b)(ii) to (2)(b)(iv); redesignated former
subsec. (3) as subd. (2)(c)(i); added subds.
(2)(c)(ii) and (2)(c)(iii); redesignated former
subsec. (4) as subd. (2)(d); deleted the last
two sentences of former subsec. (4) which
provided that the employer or insurance carrier would pay benefits to dependents out of
the special fund as provided by former
subsecs. (2) and (3), and to review the issue
of dependency at the time application was
made for additional benefits from the special
fund; deleted former subsec. (5) which provided benefits to dependents at the rate of
66 Vz % of the deceased's average weekly
wages at the time of the injury, but not more
than 85% of the state average weekly wage,
with a minimum of $45 per week out of the
special fund beginning with the time that
payments made by the employer or its insurance carrier terminate and ending upon the
termination of said dependency; redesignated
former subsec. (6) as subd. (2)(e); increased
the maximum award in subd. (2)(e) from
$15,600 to $18,720; and substituted "second
injury fund" for "special fund" at the end of
subd. (2)(e).
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hired and regularly employed elsewhere,
to pay into the special fund, provided by
this section and 35-1-70, the amount provided by 35 1-68, if she leaves no dependents. United Airlines Transport Corp. v.
Industrial Comm., 110 U. 590, 175 P. 2d
752,
CoUateral Keferences.
Workmen's CompensationC=867.
99 C.J.S. Workmen's Compensation § 304.
Compensation ns affected by external infection from, or subsequent incident of,
original injury, 7 A. L. E. 1186, 102 A. L.
R. 790.

35-1-71

Construction and effect of provisions in
relation to new or new and further disability, 72 A. L. R. 1125.
Previous loss or mutilation of member
as affecting amount or basis of compensation under Workmen's Compensation Act,
30 A. L. R. 979.
Right to compensation for new or aggravated injury as result of medical or surgical treatment, 127 A. L. R. 1108.
Settlement of claim or recovery against
physician or surgeon or one responsible for
his malpractice on account of aggravation
of injury as affecting right to compensation, 98 A. L. R. 1392.

35-1-70. Additional benefits in special cases.—If any wholly dependent
persons, who have been receiving the benefits of this title, at the termination of such benefits are yet in a dependent condition, and under all
reasonable circumstances should be entitled to additional benefits, the
industrial commission may, in its discretion, extend indefinitely such benefits; but the liability of the employer or insurance carrier involved shall
not be extended, and the additional benefits allowed shall be paid out of
the special fund provided for in subdivision (1) of section 35-1-68.
History: L. 1917, ch. 100, §79; C. L.
1917, § 3140, subsec. 7; L. 1921, ch. 67, § 1;
E. S. 1933 & C. 1943, 42-1-66.
Definitions.
Word "employer" is used in this section
to encompass an employer in a situation
where the employment status is localized
in Utah. United Airlines Transport Corp.
v. Industrial Comm., 110 U. 590, 175 P. 2d
752.
Duty to pay into special fund.
This chapter does not evidence legisla-

tive intent to require an employer -whose
employee is killed while temporarily engaged* in employment in Utah, although
hired and regularly employed elsewhere,
to pay into the special fund, provided by
35-1-69 and by this section, the amount
provided by 35-1-68, if she leaves no dependents. United Airlines Transport Corp.
v. Industrial Comm., 110 U. 590, 175 P. 2d
752.
Collateral References.
Workmen's CompensationC^SSG.
99 C.J.S. Workmen's Compensation § 296.

35-1-71. Dependents—Presumption.—The following persons shall be
presumed to be wholly dependent for support upon a deceased employee:
(1) A wife upon a husband with whom she lives at the time of his
death.
(2) Children under the age of eighteen years or over such age, if
physically or mentally incapacitated, upon the parent, with whom they
are living at the time of the death of such parent, or who is legally
bound for their support.
In all other cases, the question of dependency, in whole or in part,
shall be determined in accordance with the facts in each particular case
existing at the time of the injury resulting in the death of such employee, but no person shall be considered as a dependent unless he is a
member of the family of the deceased employee, or bears to him the
relation of husband or wife, lineal descendant, ancestor, or brother or
sister. The word "child" as used in this title shall include a posthumous
child, and a child legally adopted prior to the injury. Half brothers and
193
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INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
CASE No.85000250

ANNA WEBSTER, Widow of
GENE WEBSTER, deceased,
Applicant,

*
*
*
*
*

*

FINDINGS OF FACT

*

*

vs.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

*

L.D.S. HOSPITAL
(SELF-INSURED),
Defendant

* * * * * * * * * * * *

*

AND ORDER

*
*
*
*
*
* * * * * *

HEARING:

Hearing Room 334, Industrial Commission of Utah, 160
East Broadway, Salt Lake City, Utah, on June 26, 1985,
at 8:30 a.m.; same being pursuant to Order and Notice
of the Commission.

BEFORE:

Timothy C. Allen, Administrative Law Judge.

APPEARANCES:

The Applicant was present and represented by Virginius
Dabney, Attorney at Law.
The Defendant was present
White, Attorney at Law.

and represented by Larry

At the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing, the parties requested
that the Administrative Law Judge take the matter under advisement until June
28, at noon, to allow them an opportunity to reach a settlement of the case.
No settlement having been received by noon on June 28, 1985, the
Administrative Law Judge is prepared to enter the follow.
FINDINGS OF FACT:
The Applicant herein, Anna Webster, is the widow of Gene Webster, who
sustained a fatal industrial injury on July 20, 1979, while in the course or
scope of his employment with the defendant, L.D.S. Hospital. The injured
worker eventually died from his injuries on December 15, 1982. On January 26,
1983, the Industrial Commission entered an Order providing for the payment of
death benefits to the surviving spouse of the deceased, Anna Webster, the
Applicant herein. As the result of that Order, the Applicant was paid death
benefits at the rate of $179.00 per week through March 20, 1985, by the
Defendant.
On or about March 15, 1985, the Applicant filed an application for
continuing death benefits from the Defendant, pursuant to Section 35-1-68,
Utah Code Annotated.
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Section 35-1-68 (b)(iv) provides that "...In determining the then
existing annual income of the surviving spouse, the Commission shall exclude
501 of any Social Security Death Benefits received by that surviving spouse."
The Applicant's present income consists of the $479.00 per month she receives
from Social Security for a disability award due to her rheumatoid arthritis,
and $120.00 per month which she receives from the L.D.S. Hospital retirement
plan. Prior to the termination of the benefits by the Defendant, she was also
receiving $716.00 in compensation benefits, for a total monthly income of
$1,315.00. The Applicant's expenses are approximately $1,300.00. As the
result of the death of her husband, the Applicant collected $36,000.00 in life
insurance proceeds, and as the result of the death of her mother, she received
$9,000.00. The Applicant testified that she has $85,000.00 in money market
certificates.
As the result of those certificates, the Applicant earned
approximately $8,000.00 last year in interest income. However, she did not
invade any of her savings until the Defendant terminated her benefits,
whereupon she spent $2,600.00 of her savings. It was also revealed that the
Applicant would be paying off her mortgage in September of 1985, and
accordingly would no longer have that monthly expense.
Without considering the interest income, it would appear at first
blush that the Applicant would be wholly dependant on the benefits provided by
the Defendant, since they constitute over one half of her monthly income. The
Defendant, by and through counsel, has taken the position that the Applicant
should place her $85*000.00 in high yielding annuities, and that by doing so,
she would realize a higher income than she receives from her money market
certificates. However, the Administrative Law Judge feels that the Defendant,
is missing the point.
The point being, that it is not the Applicant's
responsibility to find the highest yielding investment so that the insurance
carrier may be benefited. However, the Administrative Law Judge does feel
that the interest income should be considered in determining the Applicant's
disposable income. In other words, the Administrative Law Judge finds that
the interest earned by a surviving spouse should be included as income,
however the Applicant should not be forced to invade the principal or corpus,
in order to meet the everyday necessities of life. After considering all of
the evidsnce on the file, Lhe Administracive Law Judge feels that the fairest
finding in this case, would be a finding of partial dependency. Further, the
Administrative Law Judge finds that the Defendant should pay the Applicant
$89.50 per week or $358.00 every four weeks which sum represents one half of
the allowance for full dependency.
With respect to the annual dependency review called for in Section 68
of the Act, the Defendant shall send an Affidavit of Dependency form, which
will be promulgated by the Commission in the near future, to the Applicant.
The form should be sent at least sixty (60) days prior to the one (1) year
anniversary of the date of this Order. The form will be sent to the defendant
and the Industrial Commission by Mrs. Webster.
The Defendant shall not
suspend or terminate benefits to Mrs. Webster after the anniversary date of
this order, unless the Affidavit of Dependency indicates a significant change
in her income level, either by increasing or decreasing.
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:
Anna Webster is now partially dependent for support purposes.
ORDER:
IT
IS THEREFORE
ORDERED
that
Defendant,
L.D.S.
Hospital
(Self-Insured) pay Anna Webster, compensation at the rate of $89.50 per week,
commencing effective March 21, 1985, and continuing until further order of the
Commission.
IT is FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant, L.D.S. Hospital (Self Insured),
shall send a Dependency Affidavit form to Anna Webster no later than sixty
(60) days from the anniversary date of this Order. In the event there has
been a substantial increase in Mrs. Websters1 income, then the defendant may
terminate benefits after the anniversary date of this Order, and the Applicant
shall be entitled to a hearing before the Industrial Commission.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review of the foregoing
shall be filed in writing within fifteen (15) days of the date hereof
specifying in detail the particular errors and objections, and unless so filed
this Order shall be final and not subject to review or appeal.

y ^ ^
^^

Timothy C. A l l e ^ ^
Adminisp^a*ftfe/Law Judge

Passed by the Industrial Commission
of Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah, this
2
day of July, 1985
ATTEST:
/s/

Linda J. Strasburg

Linda J. Strasburg
Commission Secretary
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I certify that on July _2 f 1985 a copy of the attached Findings
of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order was mailed to the following persons at
the following addresses, postage paid:

Anna Webster, 3864 South 850 West, Bountiful, Utah
Yirginius Dabney, Attorney,
Utah 84101
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Reams

84010

Building, Salt Lake City,

Scott Wetzel Services, 833 East 400 South Suite 104, Salt Lake City,
Utah 84102
Larry White, Attorney, 330 South 300 East, Salt Lake City, Utah
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ANNA WEBSTER, Widow of
GENE WEBSTER, Deceased,
Applicant,

*
*
*
*
*

*

ORDER DENYING

*
VS.

*

MOTION FOR REVIEW

*
L.D.S. HOSPITAL (Self-insured),
*
*
Defendant*
*
*
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

On July 2, 1985, an Administrative Law Judge of the Commission issued
an Order requiring the Defendant in the above-captioned case to pay continued
dependency death benefits to the widow/claims^'., Anna Webster. The Defendant
filed two separate Motions for Review assert g two different defenses. The
first Motion for Review, filed August 28, 19 , argues that the widow/claimant
is not a dependent because of the other financial resources available to her.
The second Motion for Review, filed October 8, 1985, argues that if the
Commission should find that the claimant was a dependent of the deceased, that
the additional dependency death benefits should be paid out of the Second
Injury Fund, and not by the Defendant Self-insured Employer. The Commission
is of th^opinion that both Motions for Review should be denied. A review of
the file follows.
On July 20, 1979, the now-deceased husband of the claimant sustained
multiple injuries to the head and body in a motorcycle accident which occurred
while he was making a delivery for the Defendant while in the course of his
employment.
The Defendant Self-insured Employer began the payment of
temporary total disability benefits in August of 1979. On February 23, 1981,
these benefits were changed to permanent total disability benefits because of
a physician report prepared by Dr. Robert Baer which indicated that the
condition of the claimant's husband continued to deteriorate. On December 15,
1982, the claimant's husband died due to complications associated with the
accident-caused arteriosclerotic cerebrovascular disease.
On January 10,
1983, the claimant filed an application for death benefits. On January 26,
1983, the Commission issued an Order requiring the Defendant to pay an
additional 116 weeks of benefits at $179.00 per week. These ordered benefits,
added to the already-paid 196 weeks of benefits, amounted to 312 weeks of
death benefits at the maximum rate of $179.00 per week.
Based on the January 16, 1983, Order, the Defendant continued to pay
benefits to the claimant through March of 1985. In February of 1985, the
claimant wrote a letter to the Second Injury Fund seeking information regarding continued benefits after the initial 312 weeks paid by the Defendant.
The Second Injury Fund responded to her, in a letter dated March A, 1985, that
m_T
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due to the May 1979 amendment to U.C.A. 35-1-68, the employer/carrier, and not
the Second Injury Fund, was liable for any additional dependency benefits
beyond the initial 312 weeks. Consequently, on March 15, 1985, the claimant
filed an Application for Hearing to have the matter regarding continued
benefits determined by an Administrative Law Judge. The Defendant answered
the Application stating that the Defendant had already paid the 312 weeks of
benefits specified in U.C.A. 35-1-68, and therefore, should not be liable for
any additional benefits*
On June 26, 1985, the hearing was held. On July 2, 1985, the
Administrative Law Judge issued his Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
Order awarding the claimant continued dependency benefits to be paid by the
Defendant Self-insured Employer. The benefits were computed to be $89.50 per
week, which amounted to one half the maximum rate of $179.00 per week which
the Defendant paid to the claimant during the initial 312 weeks. In determining the amount of benefits to be paid by the Defendant, the Administrative
Law Judge took into consideration income the claimant was receiving from other
sources as compared against her regular living expenses. Other income included Social Security benefits she aceived for her own rheumatoid arthritis,
retirement benefits due her deceai '. husband from the Defendant, and interest
she earned on a money market account with a corpus of $85,000.00. The
Administrative Law Judge found that the claimant should not be required to
invade the corpus of the money market account in order • to meet her living
expenses, and also ordered the continued benefits to be paid until a
substantial change in the claimant's dependency status occurred.
On August 28, 1985, the Defendant filed the first Motion for Review.
That Motion for Review objects to the Administrative Law Judge's finding that
the claimant should not be required to invade the corpus of her money market
account* The Motion argues that, at the time of the hearing, the claimant
should not have been considered a dependent, as she had sufficient resources
to provide for her necessities without the benefit of continued workers'
compensation death benefits.
The Defendant further argues that the
Administrative Law Judge failed to take into consideration the reduction of
her expenses which would occur in October 1985 due to her completing the
payments for the mortgage on her home. The Defendant points out that once the
mortgage was paid off, the claimant could pay all her listed expenses without
the continued benefits, and without ever invading the corpus of her savings.
The Defendant argues that based on these considerations, the Administrative
Law Judge should have denied the claimant continued death benefits as she was
not dependent on outside income.
On October 8, 1985, the Defendant wrote a letter to the Second Injury
Fund requesting the Second Injury Fund to agree to pay the continued death
benefits ordered by the Administrative Law Judge in the July 2, 1985, Order.
This request was denied by the Second Injury Fund on October 3, 1985. Once
again the Second Injury Fund pointed out that the May 1979 amendment to U.C.A.
35-1-68 relieved the Second Injury Fund for the previously specified liability
for continued death benefits beyond the initial 312 weeks. On October 18,
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1985 f the Defendant presented the Commission with a request to overrule the
Administrative Law Judge, and order the continued benefits to be paid out of
the Second Injury Fund.
Regarding the Defendants first Motion for Review, the Commission
notes that the issue arises due to the lack of a concrete definition of
dependency as specified in the Workers* Compensation Act. In this case, the
issue is narrowed to whether or not a claimant need exhaust all financial
resources before a finding of dependency is appropriate. As there are no
legislative guidelines in this area, the Commission feels that in this
particular case, the Administrative Law Judge fairly fashioned the award of
continued benefits by taking into account the interest income the claimant
received from her savings and excluding the corpus. The Commission finds this
to be an equitable compromise between the interests of the two parties, and
therefore, must deny the Defendant*s first Motion for Review.
The Defendant*s second Motion for Review must also be denied. The
Commission is satisfied that the intend of the legislature*s May 1979
amendment to U,C.A. 35-1-68 was to relif
the increasing financial burden
placed on the Second Injury Fund. The legislature provided this relief by
deleting the language in U.C.A. 35-1-68 specifying that the Second Injury Fund
would be liable for continued dependency benefits. The code section which the
Defendant feels contradicts this interpretation (U.C.A. 35-1-70) by specifying
a 312-week limitation on benefits from the carrier is not applicable to
continuei^dependency death benefits. That section applies to "special cases'9
which are not specifically provided for by other code sections. As the
Commission finds no clear contradiction in the reading of U.C.A. 35-1-68, and
U.C.A* 35-1-10, the Defendant's second Motion for Review is also denied.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Defendants Motions for Review
submitted on August 28, 1985, and October 8, 1985, are denied and the
Administrative Law Judge's Order dated July 2, 1985, is hereby affirmed.

Passed by the Industrial Commission
of Utah. Salt Lake City, Utah, this
T^r: day of January, 1986.
ATTEST:

Stephen M. Hadley, ChairmanX
\

\
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Walter T. Axelgard, Cprfumissioner

&^S^J
ssioner

E-3

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I certify that on January
)C
1986, a copy of the attached
Order Denying Motion for Review in the case of Anna Webster issued
January
9
, 1986 , was mailed to the following persons at the following
addresses, postage paid:
Erie V, Boorman, Administrator
Second Injury Fund
P.O. Box 45580
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-0580
Virginius Dabney, Attorney at Law
412 Kearns Building
136 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
Anna Webster
3864 South 850 West
Bountiful, UT 84010
Scott Wetzel Services
833 East 400 South, Suite 104
Salt Lake City, UT 84102
''"tarry White, Attorney at Law
330 South 300 EAst
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
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DeAnn Seely

AKIN v. AKIN DISTRIBUTORS, INC.
Cite as, Okl., 386 P.2d 769
equipping a help-your-self laundry, it is
conceivable that a seller of washing machines might be willing to reduce the price
of such articles in that situation although
the purchaser's purpose be not that of resale of the articles. To draw a distinction
in the purchaser's intended use of the
articles bought seems unsatisfactory as such
appears of small significance to the seller.
The evidence here is equally inconclusive.
One gets the impression that "usual retail
price" is an indefinite term. We cannot say
that the evidence defined the intention of
the parties to the contract in using the
term with greater clarity than this court
defined it as applied to Sec. 93.
In Stemmons, Inc. v. Universal C. I. T.
Credit Corporation, Okl., 301 P.2d 212, 216,
we held that "ordinary course of trade" as
used in 46 O.S. 1951 § 93 applied to a sale
by one automobile dealer to another if
such sale was in the seller's ordinary course
of trade, whether the sale be retail or
wholesale, and pointed out that Sec. 93,
supra, does not require that the purchaser
be an innocent purchaser or without knowledge of the mortgage, but only that the
property be sold in the ordinary course of
trade.
[5,6] We are of the opinion that the
language of the statute, supra, was intended
by the Legislature to encompass all transactions between persons who, in their ordinary business dealings, effected a sale and
purchase for a consideration sufficient to
support a simple contract. Had the Legislature intended that transactions in the
ordinary course of trade be limited to sales
at retail some indication of such requirement could have been expressed in the statute.
The judgment is affirmed.
BLACKBIRD, C. J., and DAVISON,
JOHNSON, and JACKSON, JJ.f concur.
IRWIN and BERRY, JJ., concur in result
WILLIAMS, J., dissents.
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Bern Ice L. AKIN, Petitioner,
v.
AKIN DISTRIBUTORS, INC., and
Pacifie Employers Insurance
Company, Respondents.
No. 40211.

Supreme Court of Oklahoma,
tfov. 5, 1963.
Original proceeding to review an order of the State Industrial Court denying
death benefits to mother of a deceased employee. The Supreme Court, Irwin, J.,
held that finding that claimant was not dependent upon her deceased son within
meaning of death benefit provisions of
Compensation Act was reasonably supported by the evidence.
Affirmed.
1. Workmen's Compensation €=>473
That claimant, up to time of death of
deceased son was able to take care of herself does not necessarily preclude her from
being classed as dependent of deceased son
for workmen's compensation purposes. 85
O.S. 1961 § 1 et seq.
2. Workmen's Compensation <£=4I6
Reasonable expectation of continuing
of future support and maintenance seems
to be true criterion as to who are dependents for workmen's compensation purposes.
85 O.S.1961 § 1 et seq.
3. Workmen's Compensation <S=>420
Where claimant is able to provide
himself with all necessities that are of
pecuniary value, without aid of employee,
fact that deceased employee may have
made contributions to claimant during his
lifetime and there was reasonable expectation of continuing contributions does not
necessarily mean that claimant is eligible
for death benefits under Workmen's Compensation Act. 85 O.S.1961 § 1 et seq.
4. Workmen's Compensation €=»I939
Finding by State Industrial Court as
to dependency under death benefit provi-

386 P.2d—49
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sions of Workmen's Compensation Act will
not be disturbed on review where such finding is reasonably supported by competent
evidence. 85 O.S.1961 § 1 et seq.
5. Workmen's Compensation <§= 1939
On questions of fact Supreme Court
cannot weigh evidence but is bound by order of State Industrial Court, if it is reasonably supported by the evidence.
6. Workmen's Compensation €=>I480
Finding of State Industrial Court that
claimant was not dependent upon her deceased son within meaning of death benefit
provisions of Compensation Act was reasonably supported by the evidence. 85 O.S.
1961 § 1 et seq.
Syllabus by the Court.
A finding by the State Industrial Court
as to dependency, under the death benefit
provisions of the Workmen's Compensation
Act, will not be disturbed on review where
such finding is reasonably supported by
competent evidence.

Original proceeding to review an order
of the State Industrial Court denying death
benefits to mother of deceased employee.
Order sustained.
Farmer, Woolsey, Flippo & Bailey, by
Lawrence Johnson, Tulsa, for petitioner.
Donovan & Rogers, Gerard K. Donovan,
Tulsa, for respondents.
IRWIN, Justice.
Bernice L. Akin filed a claim against
Akin Distributors, Inc., and its insurance
carrier, Pacific Employers Insurance Company, to recover death benefits under the
Workmen's Compensation Act, for and on
behalf of herself as the only dependent heir
of Hugh Lewis Akin, Deceased. Bernice
L. Akin is the mother of the decedent.
The respondent insurance carrier challenged the claim and one of the grounds
relied upon was that claimant was not dependent upon the decedent for her livelihood and support

The trial judge denied recovery for the
reason that claimant was not dependent
upon decedent within the terms and meaning of the Workmen's Compensation Act.
The order of the trial judge denying recovery was sustained by the court en banc
and claimant has petitioned for a review
of the order denying recovery.
FACTS
Claimant's husband died in 1930 and she
established a retail food store in Tulsa and
later established a second store. Her two
sons, Brown, then 15 years of age, and
decedent, then 11 years old, continued their
education and held part time jobs and assisted their mother. They sold their home
and purchased an acreage east of Tulsa
with the title being in the three of them as
joint tenants with right of survivorship.
Akin Food Distributors, Inc., was later
organized to handle and sell packaged and
canned goods at wholesale and decedent
was elected vice president of the corporation in charge of sales at a salary of
$700.00 per month. Decedent owned no
stock in the corporation.
Claimant owned a house and lot in
Tulsa; decedent had moved the house and
sold it; he then supervised the construction
of a business building or warehouse on
the vacant lot which is leased for $15,600.00
per year; it is mortgaged and the lease
rentals are applied to the indebtedness.
Claimant now owns an undivided onethird interest in the lot and building.
Claimant also owns an undivided onethird interest in the warehouse occupied by
Akin Distributors, Inc., which rents for
$15,000.00 per year and the rentals are applied to the mortgage indebtedness. In
addition to the real estate, claimant owns
stock in Akin Distributors, Inc., which has
an estimated value of $50,000.00 and is
clear of liens; $2,000.00 invested in other
stock; one Cadillac automobile and 8 riding
horses.
Claimant was receiving $200.00 per
month from her retail stores and after she
sold them for $21,000.00 and paying the iu-
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debtedness against them, she had $9,000.00
remaining. The retail stores were sold after the death of decedent. Claimant had received $400.00- per month salary from Akin
Distributors, Inc., and at the time of trial
her salary had been increased to $500.00
per month; she also had a stock dividend
of $450.00 and an annual bonus of $1186.00,
which she has not withdrawn.
Decedent had been married and had two
sons. He and his wife were divorced but
he had regularly paid money to his divorced
wife for her support and the support of
their minor children. Decedent's divorced
wife and minor children died in the accident which caused decedent's death.
Decedent had lived in the same home
with claimant except for the short time he
and his wife occupied an apartment. After
the acreage was purchased, decedent had
built a barn, tenant house, a car port, a
concrete driveway and had repaired the
place in general. He worked about the
place in the mornings and evenings; he
plowed, seeded, cut and baled hay and
looked after the horses, cattle and hogs and
tended to the sale of -he livestock and feed.
While decedent was living with claimant
he paid her $50.00 a month, and on two or
three occasions, gave her more than
$50.00, and he regularly purchased groceries.
Under this set of facts, the trial judge
found, and the same was approved by the
Court en banc, that claimant was not a
dependent heir of decedent within the
terms and meaning of the Workmen's Compensation Act.
CONCLUSIONS
Claimant contends that the true criterion
as to who are dependents is the reasonable
expectation by a surviving heir of continuing future support and maintenance;
that it matters not the petitioner up to the
time of the death of decedent was able to
take care of herself. In support of this
contention, she cites and relies on Robberson Steel Company v. State Industrial
Court, Okl., 354 P.2d 211; Sample v. State

Industrial Commission, Okl., 262 P.2d 889;
Oklahoma State Highway Department v.
Nash, Okl., 297 P.2d 412; G. I. Construction Co. v. Osborn, 208 Okl. 554, 257 P.2d
1056; Stubblefield v. Sebastian, Okl, 340
P.2d 265; Dierks Forests, Inc. v. Parnell,
Okl., 331 P.2d 392; and Oklahoma State
Highway Department v. Peters, Okl., 291
P.2d 825.
We do not find the above cases necessarily controlling in the case at bar. In
each of the cases the question of dependency was firmly established by competent
evidence showing claimant had received
benefits from the decedent workman which
constituted substantial services or contributions which were relied upon for partial
support and maintenance and there was
reason to expect they would have continued
in the future except for the intervention
of death. Also, an examination oi all the
above described cases show that we sustained the order appealed from.
[1,2] We agree with the rule of law
that the fact that claimant up to the time
of the death of decedent was able to take
care of herself does not necessarily preclude her from being classified as a dependent of her deceased son. We are also
mindful that the purpose of the Workmen's
Compensation Act is to provide the Workmen's dependents in the future with something in substitution for what has been
lost by the workman's death, and, consequently, to establish dependency, the applicant for compensation must show that he
or she had reasonable grounds to anticipate
future support from the decedent. This
reasonable expectation of continuing of
future support and maintenance seems to
be the true criterion as to who are dependents. See Oklahoma State Highway Department v. Peters, Okl., 291 P2d 825.
[3] However, we are also mindful that
where a claimant is wholly able to provide
herself or himself with all the necessities
that are of pecuniary value, without the
aid of the employee, the fact that deceased
employee may have made contributions to
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the claimant during his lifetime and there
is reasonable expectations of continuing
contributions, does not necessarily mean
that claimant is eligible for death benefits
under the Workmen's Compensation Act.
See Fox-Vliet Wholesale Drug Co. v.
Chase, Okl., 288 P2d 391, which considers
similar principles of law which are controlling under the facts in the case at bar.
In that case we said:
"Without doubt the legislative expression that death benefits are payable 'to
the dependents of the deceased employee as defined herein* refers to persons
who presently or in reasonable future
expectancy were in some degree actually relying on the said employee for
necessary support and maintenance and
persons not wholly able to exist or sustain themselves at a station in life comparable to that of the employee without
the financial aid of the said employee,
and who are heirs at law of the deceased as defined by the Descent and Distribution statutes.
"In other words, under language of the
statute of clear and unmistakable
meaning, an adult heir of a deceased
employee, which heir is not a legal dependent, and was and is wholly selfsuppoHing, or who was and is wholly
able to provide himself with all the
necessaries that are of pecuniary value,
without the aid of the said employee,
is not eligible for death benefits as provided for in the Workmen's Compensation Act."

would have continued in the future except for the intervention of death."
[4-6] This Court has repeatedly held
that a finding by the State Industrial Court
as to dependency, under the death benefit
provision of the Workmen's Compensation
Act, will not be disturbed on review where
such finding is reasonably supported by
competent evidence. See Sammons v. Faye
Construction Company, supra; Fox-Vlict
Wholesale Drug Co. v. Chase, supra; and
In re Updike's Heirs, Okl., 282 P.2d 230.
We are bound by the rule that on questions
of fact, we cannot weigh the evidence but
are bound by the order of the State Industrial Court when it is reasonably supported by competent evidence. There is
competent evidence reasonably supporting
the order of the commission.
Having determined that the order of the
Industrial Court must be sustained, we find
it unnecessary to determine the specifications of error urged by the Respondent.
Also, the question of revivor heretofore
presented by the parties is moot and need
not be considered.
Order sustained.

O I tlT «ll'Wt*t STSTtH,

In Sammons •. Faye Construction Co.,
Okl., 367 P2d 1021, we said:
" • * • Occasional benefits or sporadic gifts and donations from an adult
decedent workman will not, standing
alone, establish partial dependence upon such workman unless the evidence,
viewed as a whole, also shows that
these benefits, instead of being a mere
casual gratuity, constituted substantial
services or contributions which were
relied upon for necessities of life and
there was reason to expect that they
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Roy F. SPEED, Plaintiff In Error,
v.
George E. WHALIN, Defendant in Error.
No. 40194.
Supreme Court of Oklahoma.
Nov. 5, 1963.
Action by employee against employer
for injuries sustained when employee fell
off roof of house. The District Court,
Oklahoma County, Boston W. Smith, J.,
sustained a demurrer to the evidence, and
the employee appealed. The Supreme
Court, Halley, V. C. J., held that evidence
was insufficient to establish that there was

PAENSWORTH v. JOT STBIAL COMMISSION
Cite as 5

sequence, none that Stringham could not
have averted the collision by exercising
due care, none that there was no adequate
warning because of an unlighted truck,
none except one isolated accident sometime
before, none that indicated any kind of
hazard save the misguided diesel, none that
the Commission should have put up signs,
reduced the speed limit, or that it unreasonably exercised its authorized statutory
discretion under the facts of this case.
Contrariwise, unless we indulge speculation
or emotion based on unwarranted assumption of undemonstrated pertinent facts, we
or the jury could arrive at no other conclusion than that indulged by the trial court.
On the other hand, it would strain reason
to conclude, under the facts of this case,
that there was anything but one negligence,—that of Trone—or that of Stringham,—or a concurrence of both, which was
the concurring or sole proximate cause of
the incident here,—wholly divorced from
State involvement. Those issues persist,
perhaps, for a trial on the merits among
the remaining litigants, since this appeal
has to do only with liability as to the defendant Road Commission.
ELLETT, TUCKETT, CROCKETT
and MAUGHAN, JJ., concur.

Lorln R. F A R N S W O R T H , father of Matt
Robert Farnsworth, Deceased,
Plaintiff,
v.
rhi INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION of Utah
et a!., Defendants.
No. 13910.

Supreme Court of Utah.
April 24, 1975.

Father of deceased minor workman
was denied benefits under Workmen's
Compensation Act by the Industrial Commission and he appealed. The Supreme
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Court, Maughan, J., held that deceased
workman's father, who was legally blind,
who had relied upon workman to transport
him to veterans hospital and doctor's office, and to perform yard work at his home
and his father's home, and whose wife had
been employed for 12 years and who received veteran's disability benefit of $548
per month and civil service annuity of $220
per month was not entitled to benefits as
a dependent.
Decision of the Industrial Commission
sustained.

1. Workmen's Compensation <§=>4I2

"Dependency" within statute permitting award of workmen's compensation benefits to persons who were dependent on
deceased worker does not mean absolute
dependency for the necessities of life, but
rather that the applicant looked to and relied on the contributions of the workman,
in whole or in part, as a means of supporting and maintaining himself in accordance
with his social position and accustomed
mode of life. U.C.A.1953, 35-1-68(3), 351-71.
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and
definitions.
2. Workmen's Compensation $=»476
Deceased minor workman's father, who
was legally blind, who relied on the workman for transportation to veterans hospital
and doctor's office, who relied on workman
to perform yard work around the home
and to aid him in taking care of his parents' home, and who received veteran's
disability benefits of $548 per month and
civil service annuity of $220 per month
and whose wife worked did not have the
type of "dependency" relationship with the
deceased workman necessary to permit him
to recover under the Workmen's Compensation Act. U.C.A.1953, 35-1-68(3), 351-71.
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and
definitions.

534 P.2d—57
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J. Anthony Eyre, Kipp & Christian, Salt
Lake City, for plaintiff.
Vernon B. Romney, Atty. Gen., Frank V.
Nelson, Asst. Atty. Gen., Salt Lake City,
for defendants.
MAUGHAN, Justice:
Matt Robert Farnsworth, a 19-year-old,
sustained fatal injuries in the course of
his employment, when the truck he was
operating overturned. The claimant, Lorin
R. Farnsworth, is the father of decedent,
and he filed a claim before the Industrial
Commission, asserting that he was partially dependent on his son and thus was
entitled to the benefits provided by Section
35-1-68(3), U.C.A.1953. Upon hearing
before a trial examiner, the claim of the
applicant was denied. Upon review before
the Industrial Commission the determination of the trial examiner was affirmed on
the ground that although the applicant may
have been dependent upon deceased for
certain activities, the dependency, as expressed by the evidence, was not the type
contemplated and intended within the
meaning of the Workmen's Compensation
Act.
Applicant is classified as legally band
and has been unemployed for the past eighteen years. At the time of his son's death,
applicant was receiving a veteran's disability benefit of $548 per month and a civil
service annuity of $220 per month. Applicant's wife has been gainfully employed
for twelve years. Decedent was regularly
employed since his graduation from high
school in June, 1973. He died January
17, 1974. Claimant has one other minor
son, Mark, residing with him. Mark graduated from high school in June, 1974, and
had previously been employed during the
summer of 1973, although at the time of
the hearing he was not employed, while
convalescing from surgery.
Applicant's claim of partial dependency
is predicated upon the services his son performed and not upon direct financial assistance. The decedent had read his fa-

ther's mail and other documents, transported him to the Veterans Hospital and doctor's office for medical treatments, and
performed chores such as yard work about
his father's house. The decedent transported his father about the town to pay
utility bills and other obligations, although
claimant admitted the primary purpose of
this service was to get him out of the house.
The applicant further undertook the responsibility for caring for his parents'
home and decedent had performed many of
these tasks, such as filling the coal stoker,
doing yard work, and snow removal. The
applicant sometimes reimbursed his son
for the gasoline expense incurred in performing these services. Since Matt's death,
his brother, Mark, has performed the services previously rendered by decedent for
their father.
In this review plaintiff contends that he
was partially dependent upon his son within the meaning of the Workmen's Compensation Act.
Section 35-1-71, U.C.A.1953, specifies
two classes, who are legislatively presumed
to be wholly dependent for support upon
a deceased employee. The statute further
provides:
In all other cases, the question of dependency, in whole or in part, shall be determined in accordance with the facts in
each particular case existing at the
time of the injury resulting in the death
of such employee, but no person shall be
considered as a dependent unless he is a
member of the family of the deceased
employee, or bears to him the relation
of husband or wife, lineal descendant,
ancestor, or brother or sister. . . .
By the express terms of Section 35-171, U.C.A.1953, the subject matter of the
statute concerns those persons who are
"dependent for support upon a deceased
employee." The case law of this state has
consistently limited dependency to those
fact situations wherein the deceased had
contributed financial assistance or com-
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parable assistance such as growing food,
which was used in supporting the dependent.1
In Rigby v. Industrial Commission,' this
court stated:
Whether one person is dependent upon
another within the meaning of the Workmen's Compensation Act is primarily a
question of fact. It is the exclusive
province of the Industrial Commission to
determine the facts and to draw legitimate inferences therefrom. It is also,
in the first instance, the province of the
Commission to determine from such facts
and inferences whether dependency does
or does not exist. When, however, the
established facts and inferences reasonably deductible therefrom can lead to
but one conclusion, a question of law is
presented which this court, upon proper
application, must review.
3

This court explained:
In this case the burden was on plaintiff
to establish dependency. The Workmen's
Compensation Act creates no presumption that a father is dependent upon his
son for support and maintenance* To entitle plaintiff to compensation in this
case, it must affirmatively be made to
appear that at the time of the injury
(1) plaintiff 'relied upon his son, in
whole or in part, for his support and
maintenance; (2) that had the son not
been killed plaintiff would in all probability have received some assistance
from his son; (3) that it was reasonably necessary for the son to render his
father some financial aid in order that
the father might continue to live in a
condition suitable and becoming to his
station in life.
I. Daly Mining Co. v. Industrial Comm., 67
Utah 483, 248 P. 125 (1926).
? 75 Utah 454, 458, 286 P. 628 (1930).
1 At |» 459 of 75 Utfth, at p 630 of 286 P
«. 78 Utah 495, 501, 5 P.2d 242 (1931).
5 84 Utah 481, 488, 36 P^d 979 (1934).

In the Rigby case this court observed
the upon the record it appeared that the
father had relied upon his son for financial
aid and that if the son had lived, he
would have, in all probability, continued to
render financial assistance. This court
characterized the serious issue to be whether it could be determined as a matter of
law that the father could not have continued to live in a condition suitable and
becoming to his station in life without any
assistance from his son. After reviewing
the facts, this court concluded that the
Commission could reasonably infer the father had sufficient funds for his support
and maintenance according to his station
in life; and therefore, it could not be held
as a matter of law that the father was dependent upon his son for support and
maintenance.
[I] In Utah Galena Corp. v. Industrial
Commission 4 this court cited with approval
authority which expressed the view that
dependency within the terms of the statute
does not mean absolute dependency for
the necessities of life, but rather that the
applicant looked to and relied on the contributions of the workman, in whole or in
part, as a means of supporting and maintaining himself in accordance with his
social position and accustomed mode of
life. This concept was reiterated in Park
Utah Consolidated Mines Co. v. Industrial
Commission:5
A dependent is one who looks to
another for support, and the true criterion is whether one has a reasonable expectation of continuing or future support
—to receive such contributions as are
necessary and needed to maintain him in
his accustomed station in life.*
6. Also see Bradshaw v. Ind. Comm., 103
Utah 405, 135 P.2d 530 (1943), wherein
dependency was determined in terms of financial support, and Roller Coaster Co. v. Ind.
Comm., 112 Utah 532, 189 P.2d 709 (1948),
where the finding of partial dependency was
predicated on the son's contributions of cash,
groceries, and care of a garden which furnished vegetables and other produce for the
family.
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[2] In the instant action, the assistance
rendered by decedent to his father was not
comparable to financial assistance to maintain him in his accustomed station in life.
It was greater, it was the love, affection,
and companionship of a dutiful child; and
deserving of the highest commendation.
Such assistance, as is here shown, commendable as it is, does not establish dependency within the Workmen's Compensation Act, the purpose of which is to
provide compensation for the probable
financial loss suffered by dependents on
account of the death of the decedent.
The decision of the Industrial Commission is sustained.
HENRIOD, C J., and ELLETT,
CROCKETT and TUCKETT, JJ., concur.

°
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George E. Ballif, J., entered judgment
against defendant, and defendant appealed
and intervenor cross-appealed. The Supreme Court, Tuckett, J., held that evidence that, inter alia, corporation received
cattle under agreement with shipper that
title would pass upon payment but that
payment was not made, was sufficient to
sustain finding that ownership of cattle in
question did not pass to corporation but remained in shipper; but that defendant
bank was entitled to offset for cost of
feeding cattle which had been attached by
defendant.
Judgment affirmed.

1. Secured Transactions €=»t 16

Bank, which had security interest in
cattle of corporation which was in business
of buying and selling cattle, could claim no
security interest in cattle which remained
in ownership of shipper, who had agreed
to sell cattle to corporation, with title to
pass upon payment, but who had not been
paid.
2. Appeal and Error €=1010.1(6)

ZIONS F I R S T NATIONAL BANK, a corporation, Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
F I R S T SECURITY BANK OF U T A H , N.A.,
a corporation, Defendant and Appellant,

Supreme Court's review in cases raising questions of fact rather than issues of
law goes only to problem of whether findings of trial court are supported by substantial evidence.

v.
Don A L L E N , dba Mount Nebo Cattle Company, Intervenor, Respondent and
Cross-Appellant,
v.
J. B. J. F E E D YARDS, INC., a corporation,
et a!., Involuntary Defendants.
No. 13725.

3. Appeal and Error <§=>I0I2.I(3)

Supreme Court will not upset findings
of trial court unless evidence clearly preponderates to the contrary.
4. Secured Transactions <£=>! 16

Supreme Court of Utah.
April 15, 1975.
Bank, which had security interest in
cattle owned by shipper, brought conversion action against defendant bank, which
had security interest in cattle of corporation which was in business of buying and
selling cattle. The shipper intervened.
The Fourth District Court, Utah County,

In conversion action by plaintiff bank,
which had security interest in cattle owned
by shipper, against defendant bank, which
had security interest in cattle of corporation which was in business of buying and
selling cattle, evidence that, inter alia, corporation received cattle under agreement
with shipper that title would pass only
upon payment, which payment was not
made, was sufficient to sustain findings
that ownership of cattle in question did not
pass to corporation but remained in shipper
and did not become subject to financing
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since the support poles for the signs were
set in concrete prior to 8 December 1971,
the signs were lawfully in existence on that
date, thus compensation is due. We agree
that DOT had the burden of proving a
violation of Section 479.11(1), disagree with
the other contentions, and affirm.
National Advertising, the owner of two
outdoor signs located in Duval County, was
cited by DOT for violation of Section 479.11(1). The parties stipulated that both
signs were within 660 feet of the right-ofway of 1-95. However, National Advertising contends that these signs fell within the
statutory exception of Section 479.111(2).
The parties further stipulated that at
least the poles for the two structures were
erected prior to 8 December 1971. There
was uncontradicted testimony that there
were no advertising faces on the poles until
on or about 26 April 1972.
On 6 November 1981, DOT entered its
final order directing that the signs be removed without compensation.

I respectfully dissent and would reinstate
the recommended order of the hearing officer requiring that compensation be paid for
the taking of private property in this case.
Florida Statutes, Section 479.24, is susceptible of a construction that compensation be
paid for signs begun prior to, but not completed until after, December 8, 1971. That
construction should prevail in accordance
with the basic principle of statutory construction that, where more than one interpretation of a statutory enactment is possible, the court avoid the interpretation
which may render the enactment unconstitutional.

[1] This court held in Henderson Sign
Service v. DOT, 390 So.2d 159 (Fla. 1st DCA
1980), that the burden of proving entitlement to any of the exceptions of Chapter
479 is upon the one claiming the exception.
Therefore, National Advertising had the
burden of proving it fell within the exception of Section 479.111(2). This it failed to
do.

Alfred TERRINONI (deceased) by Ann
Terrinoni, Appellants,

[2] In LaPointe Outdoor Advertising v.
Florida DOT, 398 So.2d 1370 (Fla.1981), the
Florida Supreme Court ruled that no compensation need be made for removal of
signs that were not lawfully in existence on
8 December 1971. In view of the definition
in Section 479.01(1), bare poles do not constitute a "sign" within the meaning of Section 479.24(1). National Advertising's emphasis on the word "intended*' in Section
479.01(1) is misplaced. This word clearly
refers to a present intent to advertise or to
inform the public, not to an intent to build
a sign sometime in the future. Therefore,
since National Advertising's signs were not
lawfully in existence on 8 December 1971,
no compensation is due.
AFFIRMED.

THOMPSON, J, concurs.
BOOTH, J., dissents with opinion.
BOOTH, Judge, dissenting:
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v.
WESTWARD HO! and Kent Insurance
Company, Appellees.
No. AG-228.
District Court of Appeal of Florida,
First District.
Aug. 23, 1982.
Rehearing Denied Sept. 20, 1982.

Mother of deceased employee appealed
from order of deputy commissioner finding
that her dependency under the Workers'
Compensation Act had ended. The District
Court of Appeal, Ervin, J., held that: (1)
evidence demonstrated that mother had
been dejindent u}x>n her son at the time of
his death, bui (2) mother who was her son's
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and heir and had received
to which she was entitled,
from a combination of
longer a dependent.

Affirmed.
1. Workers* Compensation <s=>1481
Evidence that decedent gave his mother $125 each month, that he helped pay off
the mortgage on her house, that he helped
her writh the household purchases and expenses, and that she was not receiving
court-ordered alimony from her former husband, although she was receiving social security benefits, sustained finding that decedent's mother was dependent upon the decedent at the time of his death. West's
F.S.A. § 440.16.
2. Statutes o=>223.2(34)
Provisions of statute setting forth compensation to be paid for death of worker
should be read in pari materia to achieve
the statutory purpose of protecting m the
workers' dependents against hardships that
arise from the workers' death arising out of
employment and occurring during employment and of preventing those who depend
on workers' wages from becoming charges
on the community. West's F.S.A. § 440.16.
3. Statutes c=*202, 206
Statutory language is not to be assumed to be superfluous; statute must be
construed so as to give meaning to all words
and phrases contained within that statute.
4. Workers' Compensation <e=>419, 1715
Dependency for purposes of workers'
compensation is a question of fact to be
determined by the circumstances of the
case; it must be shown that the claimant,
because of physical or mental incapacity, or
lack of means, is dependent upon the deceased for support; actual and substantial
support must have been received by the
claimant from the decedent and the support
must be shown to have been made regularly
with reasonable expectation to be made in
1. The deput\ found that decedent's death did
not arise out of and in the course of his emplov
ment with the City of Cora! Gables This find-

the future; casual gifts at irregular intervals will not support a claim based on dependency; test is whether the claimant relies on the contributions to maintain his or
her customary standard of living and
whether, in the absence of continuance of
support, lifestyle of the claimant would be
materially altered. West's F.S.A. § 440.16.
5. Workers' Compensation <s=»476
Decedent's mother who, following his
death, received approximately $155,000
from a combination of sources due to being
her son's sole heir and beneficiary was no
longer a dependent and workers' compensation could be terminated. West's F.S.A.
§ 440.16.
Stephen Marc Slepin of Slepin, Slepin,
Lambert & Waas, Tallahassee, for appellants.
Kathleen V. McCarthy, Hialeah, for appellees.
ERVIN, Judge.
In this .workers' compensation case, the
mother of a deceased employee appeals the
order of the deputy commissioner finding
that her dependency under the Workers'
Compensation Act has ended, and that, as a
matter of law, she was not entitled to dependency benefits under Section 440.16(l)(b)4, Florida Statutes (1979). We affirm.
In its cross-appeal, the employer, Westward Ho!, and its carrier appeal the deputy's finding that at the time of decedent's
death he was an employee of Westward Ho!
The employer/carrier argues that decedent
was an independent contractor not covered
by the Act. We affirm the deputy's order
as to decedent's employee status without
opinion.1
[1] The deceased was a police sergeant
for the City of Coral Gabies He was killed
on October 11, 1980, in an armed robbery
while picking up the receipts in his off-duty
ing was not appealed and the city's motion to
be dismissed as a part\ has been granted b\
unpublished order of this court
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job with Westward Ho! restaurant. Appellant is the 63-year-old divorced mother of
decedent. The deputy found that appellant
was dependent on the deceased at the time
of his death, and appellees do not argue
otherwise. Such finding is supported by
competent, substantial evidence. The record shows the decedent gave his mother
$125 in cash each month, helped pay off the
mortgage on her house, and helped with her
household purchases and expenses. Appellant's former husband is under court order
to pay alimony, but she does not receive
payments. Although appellant worked at a
clothing store and began receiving Social
Security benefits in April, 1980, the deputy
found that she wTas unable to support herself.
The deputy's finding that appellant's dependency ended is based on the fact that by
December 31, 1980, she had received all
benefits due her as her son's sole heir and
beneficiary. She received a total of approximately $155,000 from a combination of
sources. As to that issue, the deputy concluded: "In order to give any meaning to
§ 440.16(2Xd), Florida Statutes [The statute
is in fact Section 440.16(l)(b)4, Florida Statutes (1979).] . . ., it is clear that it is contemplated that the dependency of a parent
under the Workers' Compensation Act can
end." Section 440.16(l)(b)4 states:
440.16 Condensation for death.—
(1) If death results from the accident
within 1 year thereafter . . ., the employer shall pay:
(b) Compensation . . . in the following
percentages of the average weekly wages
to the following persons entitled thereto
on account of dependency upon the deceased, . . .:

4. To the parents, 25 percent to each,
such compensation to be paid during the
continuance of dependency.
The deputy ordered the e/c to pay death
benefits from the date of accident through
December 31, 1980.

Appellant argues that dependency status
is fixed on the date of the employee's
death; that she qualified for benefits by
virtue of her dependency on the employee
and his compensable death, and that the
policy of workers' compensation is to preclude continuous litigation. Thus, she continues, benefits cannot be terminated, for if
a post-mortem event can terminate dependency and one's workers' compensation
rights, then another event can reinstate dependency, consequently she concludes that
the legislature did not intend to allow this
open-ended condition leading to perpetual
litigation and unmanageable administration.
Appellant supports this argument with a
passage from Professor Larson:
Once rights as a dependent under an
award have been acquired, the majority—
but by no means unanimous—view is that
they are not lost by a subsequent change
in the dependent's financial position, nor
by any change short of the events, such
as remarriage or attainment of a specified age, expressly terminating compensation by statute. Getting a self-supporting job, for example, or an inheritance
from the deceased or others, or being
adopted, or contracting a marriage later
annulled, or living with and being supported by a man without benefit of marriage, will not interrupt the right to benefits as a dependent. While this may produce occasional results inconsistent with
the spirit and purpose of compensation
protection, the administrative convenience of crystallizing of rights as of
some definite date once and for all probably counterbalances this objection.
2 Larson, The Law of Workmen's Com}>ensation § 64.43 at 11-209 (1981).
However, this section is susceptible to
another interpretation, especially when bolstered by the plain meaning of the statute.
According to Larson, rights as a dependent
can be lost by an event expressly terminating compensation by statute. Section 440.16(2) expressly states that the dependence
of a spouse of a deceased employee shall
terminate with remarriage; the dependence
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of a child shall terminate with the attainment of eighteen years of age, twenty-two
years of age if a full-time student, or upon
marriage. Dependency is deemed not to
continue past these events. The legislative
intent is clearly to allow for termination of
dependency.
There is no statutory language limiting
termination of a parent's dependency to the
happening of a specific event. Perhaps the
legislative intent was to allow for flexibility
in the individual situations concerning parents.
[2] We consider that the provisions of
Section 440.16 should be read in pari materia to achieve the statutory purpose to protect workers' dependents against hardships
that arise from workers' deaths arising out
of employment and occurring during employment, and to prevent those who depend
on workers' wages from becoming charges
on the community. See, McCoy v. F.P. &
L., 87 So.2d 809 (Fla. 1956). Here, a termination of benefits would not thwart such
purpose.
[3,4] Statutory language is not to be
assumed superfluous; a statute must be
construed so as to give meaning to all words
and phrases contained within that statute.
Vocolle v. Knight Brothers Paper Co., 118
So.2d 664 (Fla. 1st DCA 1960). Meaning
must be given to the legislature's clear
and unambiguous words "[S]uch compensation to be paid during the continuance of
dependency." "Continuance" is the time
during which something exists or lasts; duration. The American Heritage Dictionary
288 (1979). "Dependency," for purposes of
workers' compensation, is a question of fact
to be determined by the circumstances of
the case. Thus, it must be shown that the
claimant, because of physical or mental incapacity, or lack of means, is dependent on
the deceased for support; that actual and
substantial support must have been received by claimant from deceased, and that
such support must be shown to have been

made regularly with reasonable expectation
to be made in the future, and that casual
gifts at irregular intervals will not support
a claim based on dependency. Panama City
Stevedoring Co. v. Padgett, 149 Fla. 687, 6
So.2d 822, 823 (1942). The test is whether
the claimant relies on the contributions to
maintain his or her customary standard of
living and, whether in the absence of continuance of support, the lifestyle of the
claimant would be materially altered. See,
Paul Spellman, Inc. v. Spellman, 103 So.2d
661, 664 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1958); Larson &
Sons Developing, Inc. v. Ashley, IRC Order
2-3051 (1976).
[5] Claimant is not dependent upon the
workers' compensation death benefits to
maintain her customary standard of living.
The evidence, including claimant's testimony, shows that her standard of living is no
less than it was while her son was alive.
The plain meaning of the language and
the facts frustrate claimant's contention
that "there is no warrant in law" for holding that dependency at death does not fix
entitlement to benefits where the dependent receives an inheritance as a result of
the death, as well her argument that once a
parent's dependency is established at any
point in time, it continues regardless of
changed circumstances.
The section in the Act concerning the
dependency of parents has remained essentially unchanged since 1935.2 The phrase at
issue appears to have been interpreted only
once in Palm Beach Dairy Co. v. Ryan, 154
Fla. 648, 18 So.2d 537 (1944). There the
deceased employee had lived with his mother who was dependent on him for support.
The employee had been earning $17.50 per
week at the time of his death. The insurance carrier had paid compensation to the
deceased's mother for 47 weeks at the rate
of $6.25 per week. The carrier stopped
payment because some half-brothers had
entered into a contract to pay the mother

2. When this section appeared in Florida's first
Workmen's Compensation Act, it read as follows
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$15.00 per week for a limited period. The
court stated:
The question presented is whether such
payments had the effect of relieving the
mother of dependency as contemplated
by Section 440.16, . . . and thereby destroy her claim for compensation.
We think this question requires a negative answer. Who are dependents under
the Workmen's Compensation Act is relative and may be influenced by many factors, but it is not limited to such as have
a bare subsistence living or purchance a
limited income from other sources.
Somewhere along the road from rags to
affluence, the right to workman's compensation would no doubt be surrendered
but we hold this point to be above the
bare subsistence level.
Id., 18 So.2d at 537. (emphasis supplied)
In Ryan, benefits were paid to maintain the
mother's customary - standard of living.
Here, unlike Ryan, the parent, after receiving approximately $155,000.00, if not affluent, could hardly be considered at^the bare
subsistence level." We believe that Ryan
implies that there can be a dependency cutoff point.
Further support for our position is found
in Edelblut, Inc. v. Ford, IRC Order 2-2489
(1974), in which a finding of dependency of
the deceased employee's mother and minor
siblings was affirmed, but which held also
that once the mother secured employment,
dependency terminated and payments
should have been halted. Although the
mother secured employment more than a
year before the judge's order was entered,
the judge found the dependency to be continuing and ordered the e/c to pay compensation. On appeal the Commission stated
that the act "provides for death benefits to
be paid to the parents of a deceased employee from the date of death to such time
as dependency has terminated." With the
advent of the deceased employee's mother
securing employment, her status as a dependent terminated, and payments should
have also terminated. The Commission reversed the judge's order with instructions
to award death benefits only from the date
of death to the date of employment.

We believe the above considerations outweigh any need for administrative convenience requiring crystallizing claims as of a
definite date. At this point we need only
observe that the Act, by its nature, allows
for modification of orders in other situations.
Accordingly, the order of the deputy is
AFFIRMED.*
ROBERT P. SMITH, Jr., C.J.,
SHAWr, J., concur.

and
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Clarence Edward STINSON, Appellant,
v.

STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. AI-109.
District Court of Appeal of Florida,
First District.
Aug. 23, 1982.
Rehearing Denied Oct. 1, 1982.
Appeal from Circuit Court, Duval County; Thomas D. Oakley, Judge.
Clarence Edward Stinson, in pro. per., for
appellant.
Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., and Barbara Ann
Butler, Asst Atty. Gen., Jacksonville, for
appellee.
PER CURIAM.
The judgment below is affirmed.
v. State, 394 So.2d 997 (Fla. 1981)

Knight

BOOTH and SHIVERS, JJ.f concur.
JOANOS, J., dissents with written opinion.
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